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ARTICLES

Discovery and Darkness
THE INFORMATION DEFICIT IN CRIMINAL
DISPUTES
Ion Meyn†
INTRODUCTION
Does a defendant have the right to investigate the crime
for which he is charged? Courts would say yes, and in fact
impose a duty upon defense counsel to investigate.1 The
prevailing scholarship would also say yes, as it presumes a
defendant will perform a pretrial investigation that uncovers
evidence the State does not.2 Yet despite these duties and
presumptions, a criminal defendant is not structurally assigned
an investigatory role in his case.
The typical discovery statute only permits a criminal
defendant to view fragments of the State’s evidence against him,
deeming him a passive recipient of information.3 In contrast, the
† Assistant Clinical Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. I am
indebted to the members of the University of Wisconsin Law School Junior Faculty
Group and to Alex Huneeus, David Schwartz, Howard Wasserman, Mary Leary,
Jennifer Laurin, Babe Howell, Gary Sloboda, Keith Findley, and Cecelia Klingele for
their close reads and insight. I thank Leslie Kuhn, Alisha McKay, and Monica Mark for
their tireless work and contribution.
1 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (holding that a criminal
defense attorney has a duty to investigate, which implies that the criminal defense
attorney has the power to do so).
2 See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of
Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1601 (2005) (“Defense
attorneys conduct separate investigations and uncover evidence the government
overlooks.”); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A
Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 95-97 (1995) (assuming a defense attorney’s
first step in effectively negotiating a plea is to perform an investigation).
3 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (delineating what is and is not subject to
disclosure); STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL pt. 2
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State is assigned a central role in conducting a formal
investigation and, in fulfilling that duty, exercises powerful police
powers to search property, seize evidence, and interrogate
witnesses. Granted the discretion to compel information from any
source, civil litigants on both sides of the dispute are likewise
structurally assigned pretrial roles to assess liability.4 A criminal
defendant, having no discretion to compel pretrial discovery and
permitted but a keyhole view of the State’s evidence, is the only
litigant relegated to darkness. To grant a criminal defendant the
discretion and power to conduct an independent inquiry into the
incident would be to recast a defendant as having a formal role to
play in the criminal investigation.
In recognizing some degree of information disparity,
scholars advocate for more resources (adequate staffing and
sufficient funds for investigators and experts)5 and for open-file
policies that increase access to prosecutorial files.6 These
reforms would go some distance in mitigating the existing
information gap. An open-file policy has the laudatory goal of
encouraging a more informed outcome. But affording a better
view of a prosecutor’s file will rarely permit an alternative view
of the crime. The prosecutor’s file is populated with police
reports narrated by authors who have determined that the
defendant is guilty. Further, an open-file policy is not as open
as the term suggests. The policy only calls for documents from
(Advisory Comm. on Pretrial Proceedings, Tentative Draft 1969) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS] (enumerating limited categories of evidence that prosecutor must
disclose); see also Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1097, 1098 (2004) (noting the disparity between discovery rights afforded to civil
and criminal litigants); infra note 57 and Figure 3.
4 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (requiring initial disclosures); FED. R. CIV. P. 30
(allowing depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (allowing use of interrogatories); FED. R. CIV.
P. 34 (permitting a party to request production of documents and things from another
party); FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (granting broad subpoena power to secure third-party
documents and things).
5 See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors
that Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV.
263, 277 (2009) (“The most important finding from our study is the discovery that
indigent defense providers in many California counties lack the resources necessary to
conduct adequate defense investigations.”); Brown, supra note 2, at 1602 (defense
attorney’s ability to investigate is limited by budgetary constraints); Máximo Langer,
Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in
American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 236 n.42 (2006) (same).
6 Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 514
(2009) (arguing for an open-file policy); see also Brown, supra note 2, at 1637 (stating openfile discovery is best option); Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants: Responding to
Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 619, 641 (2007) (favoring open-file policy); Langer, supra
note 5, at 276 (open-file policy may diminish the coercive nature of plea bargaining);
Roberts, supra note 3, at 1153-55 (concluding open-file discovery is best solution).
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the prosecutorial file, not the larger investigative file where
any reports that do not support the State’s theory likely reside.
More fundamentally, an open-file policy does not alter the
nature of the discovery disparity. Because the policy does not
grant any discretion to compel discovery, it does not assign an
investigatory role to a defendant. In merely expanding a
defendant’s entitlement to discrete categories of information
from one source, the State, the policy maintains the status quo.
The defendant remains a passive recipient of information.
This article contends that the existing dynamic in
criminal cases is inconsistent with the design of the adversarial
system and results in a factual deficit that undermines the
legitimacy of outcomes. Even assuming a defense attorney is
well trained and well resourced, she is structurally precluded
from compelling information from witnesses, which hinders her
ability to conduct an independent inquiry into the question of
who committed the crime, and, if a defendant did commit a crime,
the degree of culpability. Only entitled to limited disclosures of
the State’s evidence, the defense counsel is instead forced to
suggest a counter-narrative based largely on documents selected
and prepared by the opposing party. Part I of this article explores
the difference between an informal investigation, to which a
criminal defendant is confined, and that of a formal investigation,
from which a criminal defendant is excluded. Part II identifies
common formal investigative powers that are extended to civil
litigants, and it employs a case study to ascertain what is lost in
the absence of formal powers to investigate. Part III surveys
potential arguments against assigning to a criminal defendant a
central role in the investigation, and responds to these concerns.
I.

A STRUCTURAL EXCLUSION FROM THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION

Once the State initiates its investigation, some portion of
the universe of relevant facts becomes known to the State—
these facts make up the State’s investigatory file. Some smaller
subset of these facts is forwarded to the prosecutor, making up
the prosecutorial file. In the typical jurisdiction, a defendant is
only entitled to a limited view of the prosecutorial file—these are
statutorily required disclosures.
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FIGURE ONE: DISCOVERY FROM A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S
PERSPECTIVE:

Facts Unknown to Both Parties
Investigatory File
Prosecutorial File
Disclosures to
Defense

The typical criminal discovery statute does not grant a
defendant formal pretrial investigatory power, defined as the
discretion to compel facts from multiple sources. Formal
investigatory powers may be expressed in various ways. In civil
litigation, these powers take the form of depositions,
interrogatories, and document requests. A criminal defendant,
however, is rarely afforded such tools. He is instead entitled to
discrete categories of opponent-sourced information found in the
prosecutorial file. A defendant is rarely authorized to view the
entire prosecutorial file or to view any part of the more expansive
investigative file. Alternate routes are closed off, as most openrecord laws prohibit access to documents that are part of an open
investigation.7 A criminal defendant does not typically have the
power to compel information from evidentiary territory uncharted
by the State that may provide an alternative theory of liability.
Rather, a defendant’s statutory role is limited to receiving what is
forwarded to him by the prosecutor. In contrast, the State wields

7 See, e.g., Neer v. State, No. 0-985, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 154, at *11-12
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2011); Barros v. Martin, No. 941, 2014 Pa. Commw. Unpub.
LEXIS 138, at *16 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 5, 2014); City of Alamo v. Espinosa, No. 1399-704, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6132, at *9 (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2001) (recognizing
exemption from the open records law for documents “integral to the criminal
investigation and prosecution process”); Nichols v. Bennett, 544 N.W.2d 428, 431 n.4
(Wis. 1996) (same).

2014]

INFORMATION DEFICIT IN CRIMINAL DISPUTES

1095

extraordinary formal powers in collecting information from any
source it deems relevant to the investigation.
These asymmetrical privileges to information create a
dynamic unique to criminal law. The prosecutor assesses the
particular facts that executive agents forward to her, releases facts
she determines a defendant should view,8 and adjudicates the
dispute through a plea offer that is supported by facts she selects.9
Though a criminal defendant has no structurally assigned role in
the investigation, he is subjected to an adversarial process. If the
integrity of the adversarial system depends on testing the pretrial
conclusion made by the executive in its investigation, the failure to
create the conditions for a counter-investigation undermines that
integrity. To be clear, no statute prohibits a defendant from
engaging in an informal investigation. Nothing precludes a
defendant (with the exception of pretrial custody) from asking
around for names of individuals who might have heard something
about the crime, to ask the manager of a gas station for
surveillance tapes, or to press a detective for information about
who told him what during the course of the investigation. But
while there is no prohibition to asking these questions, there is
also no right to a response.
A.

Informal Investigation: Best When the Stakes are Low
and There Are Multiple Sources of Information

A body at rest will remain at rest unless it is subject to an
outside force.10 Information, too, tends to remain undisturbed in
the absence of an outside force. The more force applied to a source
of information by an investigatory tool, the more is revealed. If
statutorily granted tools of investigation backed by subpoena
power and the threat of judicial sanction define what information
is subject to discovery, statutory power not afforded defines what
information tends to remain protected. In remarkably uniform
fashion, civil litigants who meet low jurisdictional minimums can
8 Bennett L. Gershman, Preplea Disclosure of Impeachment Evidence, 65
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 141, 142 (2012) (“As a former state prosecutor, I recall the
issues surrounding preplea disclosures in practice. The give and take of the relatively
informal bargaining process typically focused on how much information about the case
I was willing to share with defense counsel.”).
9 Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2117, 2120 (1998) (“[F]or most defendants the primary adjudication they receive is,
in fact, an administrative decision by a state functionary, the prosecutor.”).
10 This is Newton’s first law of motion, the law of inertia. 1 ISAAC NEWTON,
THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 19 (Andrew Motte trans.,
1729) (1687); see also STEVE HOLZNER, PHYSICS FOR DUMMIES, 64-65 (2006).
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utilize a powerful array of formal investigatory tools.11 In criminal
law, the State maintains a monopoly over investigative choices12
and is afforded formal investigatory tools that in some respects
eclipse those available to civil litigants.13 Yet, a criminal
defendant, unassigned a formal investigatory role, is left to
initiate an investigation by informal means.
Anyone has the ability to conduct an informal investigation.
It is a method we use daily. By definition, an informal investigation
consists of asking a question with the hope of receiving an answer.
When we ask a passerby for the time, we almost expect an answer.
If we fail in our attempt, we can usually turn to another passerby
and obtain the same information. In this scenario, the stakes are
typically low. The responding party faces little consequence in
providing an answer, maybe annoyance, maybe a fleeting sense of
satisfaction for engaging in an act of civility. Any negative
repercussions for failing to obtain an answer are mitigated because
the requested information is not limited by the source. The asking
party can ask any number of individuals for the time of day. In
these low-stakes, multiple-source scenarios, the informal method is
adequate to satisfy the asking party’s objectives.
The informal method’s potential limitations begin to
emerge as the stakes increase and the sources of information
begin to decrease. Take the Cabbage Patch doll shortage in 1982.
The hysteria to secure a doll for one’s child and bring holiday
happiness to the home gained national attention. Other than
resorting to bribes or violence, parents had at their disposal only
informal powers of investigation to learn whether a store had a
doll in stock.14 If sales associate #1 denied having dolls for sale, a
11 See, e.g., rules cited supra note 4; infra Figure 3. Civil litigants in federal court
are entitled to seek discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26. States typically adopt statutes that are similarly broad
in scope. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2017.010 (West 2012) (stating that parties may
obtain discovery regarding any relevant, non-privileged matter, that is admissible or
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”).
12 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or
Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 15 (1990) (noting the “many
and manifest advantages” in investigation “enjoyed by the prosecution”); Langer, supra
note 5, at 250; Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful
Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1152 (2005) (“Because it has the burden of
proof, the prosecutor collects most of the evidence.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating
Guilt: The Information Culture of the Criminal System, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 98992 (2008) (noting that the investigative sphere of the criminal justice system depends
upon “choices made by police and prosecutors,” with no role described for the defense).
13 Such powers include a threat of a probation hold and revocation, the power to
arrest, the power to search a person or place, the power to seize evidence, and the
opportunity to falsely assert that the failure to cooperate will lead to negative consequences.
14 See, e.g., JAKKS Pacific, Cabbage Patch Kids Craze!, YOUTUBE (May 1,
2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9sOlIvx7Pvs.
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motivated parent might seek to undermine or corroborate this
answer by questioning sales associate #2. But a parent could not
compel production of inventory records and sales receipts or
inspect inventory to verify these representations. And the parent
would have a difficult time sufficiently testing the personal
knowledge of any sales associate. We may not trust the answer
we receive in an informal investigation, but such a method does
not readily permit the sustained inquiry that is required to gather
information, assess critical facts, and test credibility.
The informal method presents unique challenges for a
criminal defense attorney. The stakes are high with a felony
charge—a defendant’s long-term liberty interest is at issue, and
any witness to the crime may face negative consequences for
furnishing an answer. Sources of information tend to be limited—
and may be restricted to one person, as in the case of a sole
eyewitness. From the perspective of an experienced defense
counsel, the eyewitness may be a potential alternate suspect. In
such a scenario, the eyewitness will likely be reluctant, even
hostile, to the idea of voluntarily disclosing information to the
defendant. Unlike turning to another passerby to ask the time, a
defense attorney cannot seek out another source if only one
person witnessed the crime. Where the informal method may
succeed in a single-source, high-stakes scenario, the formal
method will provide a better chance of success in a criminal case:
either the witness will comply with a pretrial subpoena, or, if a
witness refuses, the party seeking information can request
appropriate procedural or evidentiary sanctions. If the witness is
the opposing party’s sole witness, for example, a court might
prohibit that witness from being able to testify at trial due to the
failure to comply with a pretrial subpoena.
FIGURE TWO: WHERE INFORMAL AND FORMAL POWERS ARE MOST
EFFECTIVE:

Formal Investigation

Single
Source

Multiple
Sources

Informal
Investigation

Low Stakes

High Stakes
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This is not to say that the informal method lacks value in
a criminal investigation. The informal method, for example,
avoids a strategic shortcoming inherent in a deposition—the cost
of transparency. One must notify the opposing party before
taking a deposition, and what the deponent reveals is revealed
to the opposing party. A litigant must consider the risk that the
opposing party will benefit from the deposition more than he
will. (The State does not incur these risks, as it is the only
litigant in the common law system privileged to conduct
interrogations and secret grand jury hearings without notice.15)
The use of informal methods to interview a witness, in contrast,
occurs in the deep woods—if the opposing party does not hear a
tree fall, the tree has not fallen. An attorney is under no pretrial
obligation to share harmful revelations with the State. The
informal method is also potentially more efficient than the
formal method. There is no need to serve a witness or to
schedule a deposition, and there are no costs associated with a
court reporter’s transcript.16 Interviewing a witness on her own
stoop may uncover valuable information. In this setting, she
may be more candid, provide unsolicited information, and
criticize actions of police that in the presence of a prosecutor
she may not express.
Still, witnesses from neighborhoods where the line
between being a witness and a suspect is viewed as arbitrary
tend to be reluctant to divulge information. Even where a
witness initially cooperates, it is not uncommon for her to
evade questions as they become more probative and implicitly
confrontational. In an informal interview, the litigant is subject
to the will of the witness. In a formal investigation, a witness is
subject to the will of the asking party, and ultimately, the
judicial sanctions that accompany any non-compliance.
Depositions permit unyielding examination. Any obfuscation is
15 This information is subject to any discovery statute or Brady, which, as
further discussed infra, will result in little daylight for a defendant.
16 Though not required to do so, civil litigants generally use a stenographer in
a deposition, which arguably provides the most accurate record. Stenographers
generally charge an hourly rate and then charge the requesting party more per page
than a non-requesting party who wants a transcript copy. A legal blog in Minnesota
surveyed local transcription services—the commentary to the blog provides color to an
otherwise dry survey. Jack Smith, Do You Know What Your Court Reporter is Charging
Your Clients for Depositions?, MINNESOTA LITIGATOR (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.minnesotalitigator.com/2012/02/28/court-reporter-charging-clients-depositions/. At 40 pages per hour,
an eight-hour deposition using a court reporter might cost a requesting party $1,600 ($40
hourly charge + $4 per deposition page). Other options, however, are available—like a
“dirty deposition” in which a party records the deposition and has its own office prepare
a transcript, which after review is deemed accurate by party stipulation.
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on the record and may demonstrate the witness’ bias.17 Use of
formal tools permits a more ordered implementation of an
investigative strategy; to move deliberately from peripheral
witnesses (to gather background information) to critical
witnesses (to expose inconsistencies and challenge credibility).
One can attempt the same using informal tools—but in the
absence of subpoena power, it is difficult to schedule witness
testimony according to any preconceived plan. Use of the formal
method to compel documentation and testimony potentially
provides a nuanced and comprehensive pretrial understanding
of the facts at issue and the motivations of witnesses. This sort
of sophisticated approach is difficult to implement with only
informal methods, where, despite the high stakes at issue and
limited sources of information, growling dogs and refusals to
open a door may leave a defendant with no recourse.
In contrast to the informal method that relies on voluntary
compliance, the power to compel a person to appear at a place and
time to answer questions under oath may be in many
circumstances the only feasible way to capture critical pretrial
information. Other than the State—which historically has had at
its disposal police powers to conduct a formal investigation—the
power to compel information from any source was not extended to
private litigants until the advent of the modern discovery era.18
Modern-era reforms afforded formal investigatory tools to civil
litigants, but not to criminal defendants.
B.

Modern Era: Extending Formal Powers to Private
Litigants

In 1938, Congress ushered in the modern era of pretrial
fact development and testing in civil litigation.19 Before this
time, plaintiffs were first required to conduct an informal
investigation to substantiate the complaint, and only after this
burden was met could they petition the court to compel pretrial
information.20 The new rules directly afforded litigants formal
17 See, e.g., TMZ, Lil Wayne Deposition—I Don’t Recall!, YOUTUBE (Sept. 25,
2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQsMqRvPzRw.
18 See infra Part I.B.
19 John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) (discussing the expansion of discovery
in civil cases since adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938); Stephen
N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 692 (1998) (discussing adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
20 Beisner, supra note 19, 554.
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tools of investigation.21 A formal investigatory tool grants
discretion to compel relevant information from any source,
protecting only privileged information.22 Discretion is given
directly to the litigant—a court order is not needed to wield the
power. Underscoring the significance of these reforms to civil
litigation, Martin Redish likened these rights to the gift of fire.23
A formal investigatory tool does not guarantee
consideration of every relevant fact. A host of privileges protects
against the production of information—what one tells his priest
during confession may result in penance but not in paying up or
doing prison time. The low value of a case may negate the
feasibility of a full-throttled formal investigation. Other casespecific circumstances may prevent disclosure. A witness might
live in the litigant’s zip code—she is easy to find, serve, and
depose. But if the witness lives in rural Portugal, it may be
prohibitively expensive to find her (third gravel road after apple
tree), serve her (one must refer to the Hague Convention on
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters24),
and to question her (travel, translation, and lodging).25
Though the causal basis for this sweeping shift in civil
procedure is subject to debate—“exactly why this dramatic
change was made was never fully clarified by any of the key
actors”26—there is some agreement that reforms were “premised
in some sense on the notion that ‘[m]utual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation.’”27 There were also aspects of the old civil litigation
system that invited reform—plaintiffs who did not have access
to facts were somehow expected to allege facts with specificity
before gaining access to the courts.28 Reform lowered the
entrance fee (liberalizing pleading requirements) and provided
pretrial mechanisms to discover, collect, and test otherwise
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1937) (“This rule freely
authorizes the taking of depositions under the same circumstances and by the same
methods whether for the purpose of discovery or for the purpose of obtaining
evidence . . . [t]he more common practice in the United States is to take depositions on
notice by the party desiring them, without any order from the court, and this has been
followed in these rules.”).
22 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 30, 33, 34.
23 Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring
the Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 870 (2012).
24 Before engaging in civil discovery across international borders, a prudent
attorney determines whether this multi-lateral treaty applies and whether the
particular request is covered by its guidelines.
25 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006).
26 Redish, supra note 23, at 847.
27 Id. (citation omitted).
28 Id. at 870-71.
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unattainable information. These conditions, however, are not
wholly unique to civil plaintiffs. A criminal defendant squares
off against an opponent in possession of critical facts necessary
to assessing guilt. Nevertheless, criminal procedure reforms
have not attempted to counter this systemic imbalance.
Commentators have also observed procedure’s connection to the
intended expression of the substantive law. In improving
procedural fairness, civil reforms attempted to “employ
procedure as a more effective means of implementing
substantive law.”29
C.

Criminal Procedure Reform: The Birth of Disclosure

Federal criminal law has retained fidelity to the premodern conception of discovery—neither party is statutorily
granted discretion to compel the production of pretrial
information. Yet the need for reform is arguably most acute in
criminal disputes. Creating a dramatic disparity, the State
exercises police powers to compel information through nontransparent methods during an unregulated, pre-complaint
period. In 1944, when it was a foreign concept for the State to
furnish a criminal defendant with any facts, a new federal rule
permitted a defendant the post-complaint, pretrial right to inspect
any of his things the government had impounded.30 Where civil
procedure reform had already granted robust investigative
powers to litigants during this pretrial period, a criminal
defendant was merely afforded the right to inspect what was
once his. Subsequent federal reforms did not disrupt a criminal
defendant’s passive-recipient status. Rather, additional
reforms resulted in a list of disclosures—entitlements to
discrete categories of evidence. In 1966, a criminal defendant
was granted access to his own statement, his grand jury
testimony, and to reports of scientific tests—all disclosures.31 A
defendant was also entitled to documents “material” to
presenting a defense—a disclosure intended to “limit the scope
of the government’s obligation to search its files while meeting
the legitimate needs of the defendant.”32

Id. at 870.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1944 amendment.
31 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
32 Id. Subsequent reform entitled defendant to the disclosure of anticipated
expert opinion testimony. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1993
amendment.
29

30
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Likewise, constitutional rights do not disrupt the
passive-recipient status of a criminal defendant. Premised on
the idea that access to certain information is essential to due
process, the Brady right requires a prosecutor to turn over
information that is exculpatory (favorable to defendant) and
material (consideration of this information would lead to a
reasonable likelihood of different outcome).33 According to one
casebook, Brady’s obligation “to disclose exculpatory evidence
overrides any limitations on discovery provided for by a
jurisdiction’s discovery statutes or rules.”34 This characterization
overstates Brady’s impact—though a constitutional right indeed
overrides any statutory provision that impedes its application,
Brady is a weak taskmaster. Brady confers no discretion to a
defendant to compel the production of information he believes
relevant to the dispute. Brady in fact may not provide a defendant
with any pretrial discovery rights at all.35 Brady is arguably
available to only those who advance to trial, excluding 90% of
defendants who resolve the dispute before trial.36
In the remaining instances where Brady applies,
eligible information must satisfy a demanding test. The
prosecutor must determine whether any information in the
State’s possession favors a defendant, would be admissible at
trial, and would have a reasonable likelihood of changing the
outcome.37 Under this test, the prosecutor has ample room to
undervalue evidence that might otherwise be exploited by a
33 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963).
34 RUSSELL WEAVER ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, PROBLEMS &
EXERCISES 888 (3d ed. 2007).
35 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (holding Brady right does
not attach until trial). There is a split regarding whether Ruiz applies only to
impeachment evidence, or to any and all exculpatory evidence. United States v.
Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that “the limitation of
the Court’s discussion [in Ruiz] to impeachment evidence implies that exculpatory
evidence is different and must be turned over before entry of a plea”); cf. McCann v.
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating, in dicta, “Ruiz indicates a
significant distinction between impeachment information and exculpatory evidence of
actual innocence. Given this distinction, it is highly likely that the Supreme Court
would find a violation of the Due Process Clause if . . . [state] actors have knowledge of
a criminal defendant’s factual innocence but fail to disclose such information to a
defendant before he enters into a guilty plea”).
36 Robert C. Black, FIJA: Monkeywrenching the Justice System?, 66 UMKC L.
REV. 11, 24 (1997) (“[o]nly about ten percent of felony cases go to trial”); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1978 n.22 (1992)
(percentage of pleas in federal cases ranges from “80% to 90%”); H. Richard Uviller,
The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1699 n.7 (2000) (finding that trials occur in about ten percent
of criminal matters).
37 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-89,
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defendant.38 She may think that the evidence is favorable but
inadmissible. She may believe the evidence admissible, but not
likely to change the outcome. A prosecutor may also
misapprehend the standard, thinking it narrower than it already
is. In a major Wisconsin case, an experienced special prosecutor
announced to the circuit court that Brady constitutes “evidence
that clearly indicates, if you will, the guilt of a third party or
absolutely minimizes the guilt of the defendant”39—leaving one to
wonder what prosecutor would pursue a case against a defendant
where evidence established the guilt of a third party.
Brady is also susceptible to being undermined by
investigators. Law enforcement may deliver an investigatory file
that, unknown to the prosecutor, excludes exculpatory and
material evidence. In these circumstances, the prosecutor herself
will be unaware of information that should be turned over to the
defendant. As to the 10% of those defendants who advance to
trial and fall under Brady’s purview, Brady applies to and
benefits only the select few who in post-conviction proceedings
manage to find a hidden document that the defendant did not
know existed. Such efforts are typically thwarted in jurisdictions
that protect the State’s files from open-record requests during
the pendency of a direct appeal. Once a defendant has lost his
direct appeal, he is likely permitted access to law enforcement
files—but he no longer has any right to counsel. Even if such
documents are discovered, courts tend to forgive prosecutorial
neglect and favor finality.40
Where civil litigants are granted statutory power to
compel relevant information from any source, federal rules
dictate that a criminal defendant is merely entitled to limited

38 Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 351 (2006). The analysis in cases
finding Brady violations underscores these prosecutorial tendencies to diminish the
importance of the “material” evidence. See, e.g., Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630
(2012); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-38; Brady, 373 U.S. at 88. A court’s inclination to do the
same is exemplified in the Justice Clarence Thomas’ dissent in Smith. Smith, 132 S.
Ct. at 640-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
39 See Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 7-8, State v. Vollbrecht, 820 N.W.2d
443 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 2011AP425) (“The case law makes it very clear that the
defense is entitled to exculpatory evidence, and there’s a fairly high standard for what
that means. It’s evidence that clearly indicates, if you will, the guilt of a third party or
absolutely minimizes the guilt of the defendant. We don’t see that sort of evidence in
our files.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
40 See, e.g., Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 630-31. Smith split the Court’s conservative wing
and strengthened the Brady doctrine by providing a per se right to a new trial in narrow
circumstances. Id. Justice Thomas’ dissent reveals how far a judge will go to give the State a
pass for its failure to turn over evidence. Id. at 640 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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disclosures of State’s evidence.41 The federal rules influence a
significant number of states.42 Of equal influence is the ABA
Standard, the alleged liberal bookend to the federal model’s
conservative approach.43 Unlike the federal rules, the ABA
Standard provides for the pretrial disclosure of the prosecutor’s
witness list.44 More importantly, the ABA Standard requires
that disclosures occur immediately, establishing a dynamic that
emphasizes the disclosures’ relationship to informing a plea.45 In
contrast, the federal disclosures are predominantly oriented
toward trial preparation, despite trials’ rare occurrence. In the
end, however, there is little daylight between the two
standards—the ABA Standard does not change the nature of the
discovery disparity. Both standards envision the defendant as a
passive recipient of information and provide for prix fixe menus
of State’s evidence—limited disclosures from one party, the
State, to its opponent, the defendant.46 The ABA Standard does
not extend any discretion to a defendant to compel information
from multiple sources. The ABA Standard explicitly rejects the
idea that the prosecutor should be required to turn over
information relevant to the investigation, observing that the
41 These observations are drawn from the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the ABA’s standard, and a sampling of civil and criminal procedures
adopted by the federal government, as well as ten states that account for more than
half of the nation’s population and are geographically diverse: Alabama, California,
Florida, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
infra Figure 3. Of the ten states in the sampling, six share significant similarities with
the federal rule, whereas three are more closely wedded to the ABA Standard. See
YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, AND
QUESTIONS 1200-01 (13th ed. 2012) (surveying criminal discovery nationwide).
42 CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 671 (5th ed. 2008) (discussing the adoption of Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and “the proliferation of similar rules at the
state level”); Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Proceedings for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 969, 980-81 n.69 (2011) (remarking that as to the Brady-based
language of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, the state must turn over evidence “material to the
preparation of the [defendant’s] defense”); Roberts, supra note 3, at 1122 (stating that
almost a fourth of the states adopt the federal standard).
43 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3; see also Roberts, supra note 3, at 1122
(noting that the ABA standard has influenced roughly a quarter of states).
44 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at §§ 2.1(a)(i), (iii) (providing for disclosure
of witness lists and for “those portions of grand jury minutes containing testimony of
the accused and relevant testimony of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends
to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial” respectively). Given the infrequent use of
the grand jury, this latter requirement would have little practical effect. Even if it did
apply, the prosecutor would be able to make strategic adjustments that would
minimize any disclosures required under this standard.
45 Id. at § 5.1(a)(i–iii) (identifying three particular pretrial stages relevant to
discovery obligations); id. at § 5.3(a)(ii) (providing for judicial hearing to ensure
compliance with discovery obligations during initial exploratory stage).
46 The most meaningful differences are that under the ABA standard the
prosecution must turn over a witness list, and the timing of disclosures. Id. at § 2.1(a)(1).
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relevancy standard “seems too far outside the mainstream of
current American practice and expression.”47 Yet, the relevancy
standard has governed the exchange of discovery in civil litigation
since 1938.
D.

Disclosures versus Formal Powers of Investigation

A formal investigatory tool permits a litigant the
discretion to compel the production of information—she decides
what source is potentially significant and what information she
will seek. In order to refuse to comply with a formal request for
information a responding party must persuade a court that the
requested information has no potential to lead to admissible
evidence.48 Refusals to at least partially comply with a request
are accordingly rare. A responding party will invariably make
objections, but these in operation serve to protect against any
subsequent allegation that the response is not adequate.
Objections tend to be long-winded—comments like “hopelessly
overbroad,” “unapologetically vague and ambiguous,” “truly
burdensome,” “mocks rules of grammar,” or “a crushing blow
for humanity” might, for example, all appear in one exuberant
sentence. Through this noise, the sought after document or
witness is typically produced.
A litigant only entitled to disclosures, however, has no
discretion to make an independent inquiry into the universe of
facts that might inform liability. A statute or opponent binds that
discretion. A statutorily defined disclosure might require the State
to turn over to defendant any statement he made to police.49 The
defendant cannot exceed that particular statutory constraint and
request statements made by others that reference the defendant.
An opponent-defined disclosure might require the prosecutor to
turn over any document she intends to use at trial.50 Discretion
sits with the prosecutor; she may elect to turn over nothing. And
if she plans to use documents at trial, they will favor the State,
like photos of wounds. In jurisdictions influenced by federal

Id. at § 2.1(d) (exculpatory material).
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any
discoverable matter.”).
49 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A), (B), (D).
50 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(ii).
47

48
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constraints,51 pretrial disclosures are so limited that a defendant
has no discretion to obtain witness lists, police reports, or names
of investigating detectives.52 Further narrowing the significance of
disclosures, a defendant is only authorized to obtain information
from one source, the State.53
Disclosures granted in criminal law typically constitute
the beginning and end of statutorily permitted discovery.54 In
contrast, civil procedure statutes that provide for disclosures
serve a different purpose.55 In federal court, the mandatory
disclosures civil litigants make at the lawsuit’s inception are
intended to “accelerate the exchange of basic information,”
“focus the discovery that is needed,” and “guide further
proceedings in the case.”56 Though scholarship has recognized a
discovery disparity between civil and criminal litigants,57 what
is most significant is the disparity’s nature—a criminal
defendant is a passive recipient of information whereas a civil
litigant exercises discretion to compel information from
multiple sources. Based on a sampling of jurisdictions, the
following table underscores how a criminal defendant depends
on disclosures from one party, the State. In contrast, though
51 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a); see also ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16.1; ILL. SUP. CT.
R. 412(a); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2013); PA. R. CRIM. P. 573(B);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(a) (West 2009); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11(b).
52 California, Illinois, and Ohio are states in the sampling that require the
State to turn over the witness list. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(a) (West 2013); ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 412(a)(i); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(I). California and Ohio provide for disclosure of
exculpatory information. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(e) (West 2013); OHIO R. CRIM. P.
16(B)(5). Florida and Ohio require disclosure of all police reports and Florida requires
disclosure of contact information of witnesses and the interviewing detectives. FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A)-(B); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(B)(1).
53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a); see also ALA. R. CRIM. P. 16.1; CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1054; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220; ILL. SUP. CT. RULE 412; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20;
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16; PA. R. CRIM. P. 573; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. § 39.14.
54 See infra Figure 3. Typically, jurisdictions in the sample only provide for
disclosures at the request of defendant. The vast majority of discovery available to the
criminal defendant is not mandatory, but only occurs via request.
55 See infra Figure 3; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i) (requiring disclosure of
individuals likely to have information and certain documents); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(f)
(requiring disclosure of witness information if requested); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)
(McKinney 2012) (requiring disclosure, if requested, of information pertaining to expert
witnesses); PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.4 (allowing discovery of statements from parties, nonparties, and witnesses that pertain to the action); TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.1-.2 (providing
wide range of disclosure, including names of those with relevant information).
56 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
57 Robert L. Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 293, 294 (1960) (noting “a long and deeply imbedded practice designed to keep the
defendant in the dark as long as possible”); Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory
Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 845, 855-56 (1995) (noting that no
criminal discovery procedures match the broad discovery possibilities in civil
procedure); Roberts, supra note 3, at 1098 (noting disparity between discovery rights
afforded to civil and criminal litigants).
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civil litigants sometimes are provided disclosures to seed
investigations, they are as a matter of course permitted
discretion to compel information from any source.58
FIGURE THREE59:
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Not afforded any formal investigatory powers, a
criminal defendant is not assigned an investigatory role. The
typical statute permits him to passively receive pretrial
evidence from one source. Collected and summarized by his

See infra Figure 3.
(X - Broad Discovery Right) (/ - Limited Discovery Right). There is no
bright line test in determining what discovery rights afforded are “broad” versus
“limited.” It is a comparative analysis.
58

59
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opponent, this evidence is weighted against him. A defendant
may conduct an informal investigation, but this method is not
well suited for the high-stakes, limited-source scenario that
tends to define criminal cases. As the sole party assigned an
investigatory role, the State uses formal powers to develop
facts and establish the narrative. What law enforcement turns
over to the prosecutor is typically a subset of the investigative
file. And what a prosecutor turns over to a defendant is a
subset of the prosecutorial file.60 This limited disclosure will
constitute “the facts of the case” for a defendant who is unable
to extract further information through informal means.61 The
conditions that triggered reform to civil procedure are thus
present in criminal law; a criminal defendant is situated
against a motivated opponent who controls the facts. Without
the formal power to develop a counter-narrative, a criminal
defendant is consequently subject to an adversary who controls
all aspects of pretrial litigation.62
II.

WHAT IS LOST FOR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS

Although the formal investigatory tools exercised by
civil litigants may not be tailored to the criminal law, an
exploration of what it means to have such tools—depositions,
document requests, interrogatories—reveals what is lost in
their absence.
A.

Formal Investigatory Tool: Depositions

All 50 states authorize civil litigants to depose
witnesses.63 By this power, an attorney may compel any person
to appear and answer questions under oath. Questions are not
constrained by rules of evidence that apply at trial. By design,
depositions permit inquiry into inadmissible hearsay (“you
heard Joey say that Frank hated the victim?”), other acts (“you
heard that the Frank had been convicted for battery six months
See supra Figure 1.
See supra Part I (noting that disclosures only provide limited access to the
State’s, and only the State’s, evidence).
62 Langer, supra note 5, at 250 (stating in many cases the prosecutor, in control
of the evidence, successfully plays the role of sole adjudicator in plea negotiations); Lynch,
supra note 9, at 2120; Natapoff, supra note 12, at 968 (stating “the investigative sphere is
the most powerful adjudicative arena, in which police and prosecutorial decisions about
information and potential liability determine the circumstances under which individuals
must confront the coercive powers of the state”).
63 Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power, Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74
MINN. L. REV. 37, 150 (1989).
60

61
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before the crime?”), and character evidence (“is Frank easily
provoked to violence?”); all are ingredients to an effective
investigation.64 In some jurisdictions there are no time limits to
the deposition. Even if limited by time, a deposition frees an
attorney from the pressure of eliciting in-court testimony from
a sophisticated and recalcitrant witness.65 The cost of witness
prevarication is shifted from the questioning party to the
witness and opposing party. Absent are the theatrics that tend
to undermine the legitimacy of trial. In trial, a witness can play
dumb and take a long time to refresh his recollection or
understand the meaning of a simple passage. This tactic
interrupts tempo. The trier of fact’s interest wanes during
periods of silence. In a deposition, such tactics are mere
antics—the requesting party will note on the record the
inordinate time the witness is taking to answer questions and,
if necessary, will seek sanctions and secure permission to
extend time to finish the deposition. The deposition is designed
to collect a broad understanding of motives and facts that
define a dispute. In operation, a deponent will be compelled to
answer most questions. Any objection to a question that does
not invoke a privilege typically accomplishes little—the witness
must eventually answer.66 An attorney may attempt to suspend
a deposition because the asking party is badgering the witness
or going beyond the scope of permissible questions. But hell
hath no looks of annoyance like a judge drawn into a petty
discovery dispute. The civil deposition power is permissive in
theory and unrestrained in fact.67 This liberal application of the
64 David Young, A New Theory of Relativity: The Triumph of the Irrelevant at
Depositions, 36 UWLA L. REV. 56, 59 (2005) (“[T]he concept of relevance is still the
primary focus at depositions in determining the permissible scope of discovery.”).
65 Florida, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin statutes place no
time limits on depositions. See supra Figure 3; see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.310; N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3106 (McKinney 2013); OHIO R. CIV. P. 30; PA. R. CIV. P. 4007.1; WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 804.05 (West 2010). Federal Rules, Alabama, California, Illinois, Texas, and
Virginia place time limits on depositions. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (seven hours); ALA. R. CIV.
P. 30 committee comments to Aug. 1, 2004 amendment (five hours per day); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 2025.290 (West 2013) (seven hours); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 206(d) (three hours);
TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.5(c) (six hours, though case and corresponding discovery level may
demand a longer period of time); VA SUP. CT. R. 4:5(b)(3) (allowing court discretion to
set time limitation).
66 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that “[t]he
examination and cross-examination of a deponent proceed as they would at trial under
the Federal Rules of Evidence,” there are distinctions between trial practice and
depositions. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1). Objections during depositions can be made and
noted, but the deponent must respond unless the objection relates to the need to
preserve a privilege or enforce a court order. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2).
67 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (a person subject to a successful motion to
compel disclosure faces the prospect of paying the “movant’s reasonable expenses
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deposition power is not a given. A deposition, like any
investigatory tool, may be tailored to address concerns
particular to any type of dispute.
Four states extend deposition power to criminal
defendants in a manner approaching equivalence to the civil
deposition: Vermont, Missouri, Indiana, and Florida.68 These
states permit parties to depose broad categories of individuals,
police officers and victims included.69 In New Mexico, parties
may issue a pretrial subpoena and take a recorded
statement70—an affordable “dirty deposition” subject to wide
use, more cost-effective than a traditional deposition, and a tool
that demonstrates how innovations to formal investigatory
tools might respond to concerns particular to the criminal
justice system.71 Even in states that nominally allow
depositions to criminal defendants, some require a defendant to
make the formidable showing that the witness is “material and
necessary.”72 In more restrictive jurisdictions, a defendant may
only petition the court to take a deposition to preserve
testimony—like that of a key witness on her deathbed.73 The
incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees”); W. R. Grace & Co. v.
Pullman, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 80, 84 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (“The harm caused by being required
to take additional depositions of a witness who fails to answer a question based on an
improperly asserted objection far exceeds the mere inconvenience of a witness having
to answer a question which may not be admissible at the trial of the action.”); Banco
Nacional De Credito Ejidal v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 11 F.R.D. 497, 499 (N.D. Cal.
1951) (“Basically the propriety of probing any matter within the knowledge of deponent
is dependent upon relevancy—and relevancy, especially at the pre-trial stage, is very
liberally construed.”).
68 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-3 (2013); MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.12
(allowing a defendant to take the deposition of any person); MO SUP. CT. R. 25.15 (allowing
prosecuting attorney to obtain deposition of any person); VT. R. CRIM. P. Rule 15.
69 FLA. R. CRIM P. 3.220(h); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-3; MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.12; MO.
SUP. CT. R. 25.15; VT. R. CRIM. P. 15.
70 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-503 (West 2013) (allowing statements from any person
and depositions by agreement of parties or by court order to prevent injustice).
71 Interview with Katherine Judson, Innocence Project Litigation Fellow, in
Madison, Wis. (Oct. 23, 2012) (“Dirty deposition” is the nom de guerre assigned by
author); see also, Rule 5-503 of New Mexico District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure
(“Any person, other than the defendant, with information which is subject to discovery
shall give a statement. A party may obtain the statement of the person by serving a
written ‘notice of statement’ upon the person to be examined and upon each party not
less than five (5) days before the date scheduled for the statement. The notice shall
state the time and place for taking of the statement.”).
72 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-201 (West 2013) (stating a deposition of
a prospective witness may be taken if the witness will be unable to attend trial or the
witness “is unwilling to provide relevant information to a requesting party and the
witness’s testimony is material and necessary in order to prevent a failure of justice”).
73 ALA. R. CRIM. P. RULE 16.6; ALASKA R. CRIM. PROC. 15; ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-44-202 (West 2013); COLO. CRIM. P. 15; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86 (West
2013); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 15; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-13-130 (2013); HAW. R. PENAL
P. 15; IDAHO CRIM. R. 15; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 414; KY. R. CRIM. P. 7.10; ME. R. CRIM. P. 15;
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federal statute is one of these jurisdictions, providing that a
“party may move that a prospective witness be deposed in order to
preserve testimony for trial. The court may grant the motion
because of exceptional circumstances and in the interest of
justice.”74 In these jurisdictions, the deposition is explicitly not
intended to be a pretrial discovery tool but is instead oriented
toward the trial moment. Remaining jurisdictions deny deposition
power by omission (the lack of any provision granting defendant
the right to request one).75
B.

Formal Investigatory Tool: Production of Documents

Civil litigants have the pretrial power to request the
production of documents from the opposing party76 that are
relevant to any claim or defense.77 A responding party must
make a “reasonable effort to assure that the client has provided
all responsive information and documents available to him . . . .”78
Federal criminal procedure, too, purports to make documents and
objects “subject to disclosure.”79 These procedures, however, have
very different DNA. Federal criminal procedure does not afford a
defendant any discretion to compel documents of a defendant’s
choosing, but rather designates distinct categories of documents
subject to disclosure. The first category requires the State turn
over documents it intends to use “in its case-in-chief at trial”80—
any documents revealed by this disclosure will favor the State’s
case. The second category requires the disclosure of any item that
was “obtained from or belongs to the defendant,” a tell-me-what-Ialready-know disclosure.81 The last category provides that the
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 4-261 (West 2013); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 35; NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 174.175 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. R. § 3:13-2 (West 2013); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 660.20 (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-74 (West 2013); OHIO R.
CRIM. P. 15; OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 22, § 762 (West 2013); PA. R. CRIM. P. 500; R.I. SUPER. CT.
R. CRIM. P. 15; S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3-940 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-12-1 (2013);
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 15; UTAH R. CRIM. P. 14; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.6; W. VA. R. CRIM. P.
15; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (West 2013); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 15.
74 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1) (emphasis added).
75 Criminal procedure statutes in Louisiana and Virginia do not address
depositions.
76 See e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34; ALA. R. CIV. P. 34(a); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 2031.010 (West 2013);FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.350(a); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 214; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3120
(McKinney 2013); OHIO R. CIV. P. 34(A); PA. R. CIV. P. 4009.1; TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.1(a);
VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:9(a); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 804.09 (West 2013).
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
78 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 1983 Amendment.
79 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1).
80 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(ii).
81 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(iii).
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State must turn over items “material to preparing the defense.”82
Some courts maintain the Brady standard does not govern this
provision83 whereas others look to Brady for guidance.84 The
debate underscores the cautious nature of the provision’s
language. In determining what is “material” to the defense, the
State is prone to undervalue evidence helpful to the defendant.85
These three categories permitting limited disclosures from a
single source fall well short of the formal power and discretion to
request documents that are extended to civil litigants.
Providing more robust disclosure rights for a criminal
defendant than either the federal or ABA standards, Florida is
again an outlier. Florida requires that, upon request, a
prosecutor turn over all investigative reports.86 Florida’s
statute does, however, protect notes of investigators from
disclosure.87 Yet these notes provide an unedited version of
what later is altered or omitted in the resultant police report.
The potential significance of an agent’s notes is underscored in
the United States Supreme Court’s Smith v. Cain decision.88
Eyewitness Larry Boatner implicated Defendant Smith in a
New Orleans shooting. Boatner testified that gunmen entered
his friend’s home and began shooting.89 At trial, Boatner
identified Smith as a shooter. After trial, the defense learned of
a detective’s notes that stated “Boatner ‘could not . . . supply a
description of the perpetrators other then [sic] they were black
males.’”90 This case demonstrates how the non-transparent
method employed by the State provides an opportunity for
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i).
See supra notes 33-38, for a discussion of Brady. The Brady right only
applies to admissible evidence; it does not provide for any right to investigate, but
rather is animated by the much narrower concept of due process. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Under Brady, the “materiality” standard is rigorous; a
document is only material if it has a reasonable probability of changing the outcome.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
84 ROBERT M. CARY ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 95 (2011) (“Courts
sometimes equate the Rule 16(a)(1)(E) materiality standard with the Brady rule, which
also has a materiality component. Other courts have disagreed, and rightly so.”)
(footnotes omitted).
85 See supra Part I.C. (discussing Brady and issues surrounding the
exculpatory and material standard); see also Findley & Scott, supra note 38, at 351
(“Brady demands too much of prosecutors when it simultaneously asks them to act as
advocates charged with prosecuting a defendant and as neutral observers responsible
for assessing the value of evidence from the defendant’s perspective.”).
86 FLA. R. CRIM. P. § 3.220(b)(1).
87 FLA. R. CRIM. P. § 3.220(b)(1)(B).
88 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012).
89 Id. at 629-30.
90 Id. at 629. The State also failed to disclose Boatner’s statement that he
“‘could not ID anyone because [he] couldn’t see faces’ and ‘would not know them if [he]
saw them.’” Id. at 630.
82

83

2014]

INFORMATION DEFICIT IN CRIMINAL DISPUTES

1113

abuse of power—the detective should not have omitted such
evidence from the police report. These notes in the Smith case
would not be discoverable under Florida’s statute. Without
statutory protection, a defendant must rely on Brady. But the
Brady right only attaches once a defendant advances to trial.
For the 90% of criminal defendants who enter pleas, the State
would potentially be given impunity for its officers engaging in
such behavior.
Civil litigants are authorized to subpoena documents
from non-parties for the purpose of conducting a pretrial
investigation.91 A criminal defendant may not typically use a
third-party subpoena (subpoena duces tecum) as a pretrial
investigatory tool.92 Rather, the subpoena duces tecum in
criminal disputes is usually limited to expediting any trial or
evidentiary hearing by requiring the disclosure of documents
close in time to the upcoming hearing.93 Even then, the standard
for its use is typically stringent. Under federal law, a criminal
defendant must in a court proceeding demonstrate: (1) each item
sought is likely admissible, (2) “not otherwise procurable through
due diligence prior to trial,” (3) that defendant would be unable to
“properly prepare for trial without such [pre-trial] production and
91 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as each state in Fig. 3 allow
for civil litigants to obtain documents and things from both parties and nonparties.
FED. R. CIV. P. 34, 45(c); ALA. R. CIV. P. 34(a), 45(a)(3); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 2031.020(b), 2020.410, 2025.280(b) (West 2013); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.350(b), 1.351(a),
1.410(c); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 214; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3120, 3111; OHIO R. CIV. P. 34(A)-(C),
45(A)(1)(b)(iii)-(vi); PA. R. CIV. P. 4009.1, 4009.12(a)(1)-(2), 4009.21(a), 4009.23(a); TEX.
R. CIV. P. 196.1(a), 196.2(a), 205.1(c)-(d), 205.3(a); VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:9(a)-(b), 4:9A(a)-(b);
WIS. STAT. § 804.09(1)-(3); 805.07(2)(a) (2013).
92 In jurisdictions surveyed in Figure 3, a federal criminal defendant, as well
as a criminal defendant in Alabama, Ohio, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, and Texas may not use the subpoena duces tecum to conduct a pretrial
investigation. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1) (under Bowman Dairy Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951), the subpoena duces tecum’s purpose “was not intended
to provide an additional means of discovery. Its chief innovation was to expedite the
trial by providing a time and place before trial for the inspection of the subpoenaed
materials”); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 17.3 (stating in statute’s commentary that “[t]his rule is
not intended to be a discovery device”); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 17(c) (according to In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon Attorney Potts, 796 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Ohio 2003),
use of the subpoena duces tecum is restricted to the trial moment—and any effort to
use it in advance of trial requires a showing that the requested document(s) will be
admissible); PA. R. CRIM. P. 107 (comments stating that subpoena only used for
hearings or trial); People v. Hart, 552 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (defendant may
not use subpoena duces tecum as a discovery tool); People v. Magliore, 679 N.Y.S.2d
267, 270 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1998) (purpose of subpoena duces tecum is limited to
compelling “specific documents that are relevant and material to facts at issue in a
pending judicial proceeding”); Cruz v. State, 838 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. App. 1992)
(consistent with federal rule); State v. Schaefer, 746 N.W.2d 457, 461 (Wis. 2008)
(holding a defendant may not use subpoena duces tecum as a discovery tool).
93 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974).
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inspection,” and (4) that the request “is made in good faith.”94 A
criminal defendant in more liberal jurisdictions will still
encounter significant hurdles, like requirements that a subpoena
duces tecum require a court hearing in which defendant must
demonstrate a material need for the requested documents.95
C.

Formal Investigatory Tool: Interrogatories

Interrogatories—written questions to secure investigative
leads—are valuable at a dispute’s inception; a party can require
the opponent to list facts in support of the opponent’s allegations,
along with the identity of individuals with information and
documents that provide the basis for those assertions.96 Responses
must “represent the collective knowledge of the opponent.”97
Granted to civil litigants,98 interrogatories are not extended to
either the prosecution or the defense in jurisdictions influenced
by federal and ABA standards. Florida again distinguishes
itself; the equivalent of a “form interrogatory” (a list of judicially
or legislatively authorized questions that in civil litigation may
be propounded and are not subject to any objection) is embedded
in its statute. Florida requires the prosecutor to disclose “a list of
the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecutor
to have information that may be relevant to any offense charged
or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be
presented at trial,”99 an evidentiary category that captures

Id.
In jurisdictions surveyed in Figure 3, to use a subpoena duces tecum in
Virginia and Florida, court intervention is required and a “materiality” standard must
generally be satisfied. FLA. R. CRIM. P. § 3.220(f) (“[o]n a showing of materiality, the
court may require such other discovery to the parties as justice may require”); VA. SUP.
CT. R. 3A:12(b) (requiring that requesting party include an affidavit “that the
requested writings or objects are material to the proceedings,” and in Commonwealth v.
Faulkner, 82 Va. Cir. 417, 422-23 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2011), the court stated that subpoena
duces tecum’s use for limited discovery is permissible); Millaud v. Superior Court, 227
Cal. Rptr. 222, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that “the lack of specific statutory
authority for the procedure is not conclusive” and that the court has “an inherent
power ‘to develop rules of procedure aimed at facilitating the administration of criminal
justice and promoting the orderly ascertainment of the truth’”).
96 Edward L. Miner & Adrian P. Schoone, The Effective Use of Written
Interrogatories, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 29, 30 (1976) (“Interrogatories are often preferable to
depositions for identifying such things as witnesses, documents, the dates and
substance of transactions and conversations.”).
97 Id. at 29.
98 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 33; ALA. R. CIV. P. 33; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 2030.030 (West 2007); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.340(a); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213; N.Y. C.P.L.R.
3130 (McKinney 2013); OHIO R. CIV. P. 33; PA. R. CIV. P. 4005(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 197;
VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:8(a); WIS. STAT. § 804.08 (2013).
99 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A).
94
95
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eyewitnesses, alibi witnesses, investigating officers, and
witnesses the prosecutor does not intend to call.100
D.

In the Neighborhood: What it Would Mean to Have
Formal Investigatory Tools

How would having access to the formal investigatory
tools available to a civil litigator—interrogatories, document
requests, depositions—impact a criminal case? Would doing so
reduce false positives, increase accuracy in outcomes, gain
efficiencies, or improve conceptions of procedural justice and
prosecutorial integrity? A recent case involving the homicide of
Rodolfo Jimenez in Racine, Wisconsin provides a starting point
to examine these questions.101 Shawn Milton was tried for
shooting Jimenez. Milton’s trial, which took only two days,
resulted in a guilty verdict and life imprisonment. At trial,
Milton’s defense counsel did not call a single witness. In a wellresourced post-conviction inquiry that resulted in a new trial, the
appellate team discovered information that under typical rules of
criminal procedure would have remained undisclosed. The
appellate team, for example, secured the State’s investigative file
through open-record requests, a method unavailable before trial.
Every piece of information discovered in the post-conviction
inquiry would have been subject to pretrial production had Milton
had the investigatory tools available to civil litigants.
At 10 PM on January 16, 2006, Rodolfo Jimenez was
gunned down in the street. From an apartment window, an
eyewitness observed two individuals facing Jimenez run south.
No weapon or bullet casings were found. Two years later an
individual told police he had heard that seven individuals were
involved in the Jimenez shooting. He named, among others,
Milton. Canvassing the neighborhood generated more heat than
light—individuals who did not witness the crime nonetheless
implicated various people. Because typical discovery statutes
provide for little discovery, these complexities and contradictions
typically remain unknown to the defense after a prosecutor
presents charges in such a case.
One of the young men implicated was Matthew Roth.
Police questioning of Roth resulted in a detailed written
statement. According to his statement, Roth approached “a
Id.
An actual case, names of individuals have been changed, as well as dates
and other identifying details. A redacted copy of the appellant’s brief is on file with the
author and the Brooklyn Law Review.
100
101
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Mexican” for a cigarette and said, “Dame un cigarillo.” Jimenez
responded, “Fuck you, get a job.” Roth heard a gunshot. Jimenez
doubled over. Roth looked back to see a gun in Milton’s hand.
After signing the statement on every page—a tactic to aid the
prosecutor at trial (for impeachment purposes, a prosecutor will
make it clear to a jury that the witness signed each and every
page)102—Roth was released from custody.
The State filed charges against Milton. Milton sat in
custody for seven months. A criminal defense attorney would
typically receive little pretrial information during this time.
But, a civil litigator wielding formal investigatory powers
would immediately serve interrogatories (accompanied by a
request for documents):103
1. State all facts that support allegations in the
Complaint, describing documents and providing contact
information of individuals who have information
supporting these facts.
2. Provide contact information of suspects and of those
implicated in the shooting, describing documents that
reference these individuals.
3. Provide a description of all items collected in the
investigation, along with all forensic documents.
4. Provide contact information of all individuals
interviewed by law enforcement in the investigation,
describing all related documents.
From this first formal investigatory act, the civil
litigator would learn of Roth’s written statement implicating
Milton. In any jurisdiction following the federal rules, a
prosecutor would not turn this statement over until after Roth
testified at trial.104 The civil litigator’s initial round of discovery
would also reveal that Roth implicated Milton only after police
subjected Roth to a 10-hour interrogation in the middle of the
night. A civil litigator would file additional discovery requests
102 In the Milton trial, Roth started to change his story—the prosecutor blew up
every page of his statement and surrounded Roth with a life-sized version of his statement.
103 These interrogatories are compressed and do not follow the traditional format.
104 In the Milton case, the prosecutor did turn this statement over to the
defense before being obligated to do so; the prosecutor was only required to turn it over
a few weeks before trial. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 971.23(1), 971.23(1)(e) (West 2011). Under
federal law, the prosecutor would not have to turn this statement over until after Roth
testified at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012).
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(discovery begets discovery), and, as the massive post-conviction
investigative file illustrates, such efforts likely would have
uncovered the following before trial:
1. Reports indicating detectives picked up Roth and
told him he was a suspect for Jimenez’s murder.
2. Reports that at the beginning of the 10-hour
interrogation, Roth denied any knowledge of the
shooting.
3. Reports that during the 10-hour interrogation,
officers falsely suggested to Roth that Milton had
implicated Roth in the shooting. Reports indicate
that only after hearing this falsehood did Roth
implicate Milton.
4. Reports that on the same block, just six weeks before
the Jimenez shooting, Roth shot at an unarmed
man. The man barely escaped (Roth shot out the
victim’s back window; a bullet had lodged in the
front passenger seat). Roth was not prosecuted—
perhaps, as a civil litigator might have learned,
because Roth’s sister was a Racine police officer.
5. Reports that Roth was found in possession of a large
cache of ammunition and a handgun before and after
the Jimenez shooting.
In the typical jurisdiction, these documents would not
be subject to pretrial disclosure—in post-conviction proceedings
in the Jimenez case, for example, the prosecutor argued he had
no obligation to turn over reports of Roth’s prior shooting.
To guide deposition choices, a civil litigator will use a key
document like Roth’s written statement. A civil litigator would
attempt to undermine or confirm the statement’s representations
by deposing detectives who interrogated Roth, any person
mentioned in the statement, and Roth. According to Roth’s
statement, Dante Randall cut Roth’s hair on Randall’s front
porch on the day of the shooting. But meteorological data
indicated it was 23 degrees below freezing that day, and the
house described by Roth on Green Street turned out to have an
open porch—hostile conditions for a haircut.
By informal investigative means, it took the appellate
team three months to persuade Roth’s alleged barber, Randall,
to meet at Burger King. He entertained questions for 20
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minutes—an insufficient amount of time in an inappropriate
venue to discuss police reports, neighborhood history, any
criminal history, and a homicide. In a pretrial context, having
the fortune to secure a critical witness’ momentary attention
does not qualify as a discovery plan. Randall’s reluctance to
meet would likely be more acute at a pretrial stage, given the
warranted fear in neighborhoods like his that knowledge about
a crime makes one a suspect. But a civil litigator, compelling
Randall’s attendance, would have found that Randall did not
cut white people’s hair (Roth is white) and would not cut hair
on an open porch in winter. At a deposition, the civil litigator
would learn that Randall was not even certain that he lived on
Green Street in January of 2006. This uncertainty was
significant. Roth had stated that after Randall gave him a
haircut, Roth walked to the rear garage of Randall’s Green
Street home and observed Milton with the same revolver he
observed in Milton’s hand at the shooting. The State argued
that this fact showed Milton had the opportunity to shoot
Jimenez. But if Randall had not lived on Green Street, then
Roth’s recollection of events was mistaken or a work of fiction.
A civil attorney would issue subpoenas to compel
production of documents from third parties. Criminal
defendants typically do not have this pretrial investigatory
power.105 Formal discovery tools available to a civil attorney
would have required the Green Street home’s owner to search
boxes in her attic—her receipts indicated Randall had moved
out in September 2005, four months before the shooting. A civil
attorney would compel the utility company to release
information—she would learn that in September, Randall’s bill
had been transferred to a house on Lakeside Avenue. A
subpoena to the Lakeside Avenue owner for his rental records
would have confirmed Randall’s move. A visual inspection of
the Lakeside home indicated that it did not have a front porch
or a rear garage. Roth had manufactured a significant fact.

105 In jurisdictions surveyed in Figure 3, a federal criminal defendant, as well
as a criminal defendant in Alabama, Ohio, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, and Texas may not use the subpoena duces tecum to conduct a pretrial
investigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34, 45(c); ALA. R. CIV. P. 34(a), 45(a)(3); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 2031.020(b), 2020.410, 2025.280(b) (West 2013); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.350(b),
1.351(a), 1.410(c); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 214; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3120, 3111; OHIO R. CIV. P. 34(A)(C), 45(A)(1)(b)(iii)-(vi); PA. R. CIV. P. 4009.1, 4009.12(a)(1)-(2), 4009.21(a), 4009.23(a);
TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.1(a), 196.2(a), 205.1(c)-(d), 205.3(a); VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:9(a)-(b),
4:9A(a)-(b); WIS. STAT. § 804.09(1)-(3); 805.07(2)(a) (2013); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974).
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The surface was scratched. A civil attorney, however,
would go further than merely undermining the credibility of
the State’s key witness; she would use formal investigatory
powers in search of an alternative theory of liability. To
establish a link between the two shooting incidents, she would
depose eyewitnesses to the shooting Roth had committed just
weeks before the Jimenez incident. She would discover that
Roth needed little provocation to unleash a stream of bullets—
that Roth emerged from the alley and shot into the victim’s car
because the victim verbally defended his girlfriend against
insults hurled by Roth’s friends.
A civil attorney would also depose Antonio Hernandez,
who was mentioned in police reports but never questioned by
police. Under informal investigatory methods, it took the
appellate team months to arrange a meeting. Hernandez’s
reluctance to cooperate was attributable in part to his status as a
confidential informant. If he turned against the State, the State
could deem him a liar and reinstate drug charges against him. In
providing any information exculpatory to Milton, Hernandez
faced the prospect of losing his union job and going to prison. A
civil attorney, however, would be entitled to compel Hernandez’s
attendance and testimony—and would learn that, on the night of
the shooting, Roth had confessed to killing Jimenez.106
After a yearlong investigation, Milton’s appellate team
presented 10 witnesses and 50 exhibits in an eight-day
evidentiary hearing. Confronted with new facts, Roth claimed
his right against self-incrimination and refused to answer.
Moved by a cohesive narrative that suggested that Roth, and
not Milton, was the perpetrator, the court granted Milton a
new trial. Months later Milton pled no contest to greatly
reduced charges that capped incarceration at five years. He
walked free on a “time-served” sentence. Had Milton been
afforded pretrial power to compel documents and testimony,
information developed by the appellate team’s investigation
would have emerged before trial, not after Milton’s conviction.
On the one hand, greater resources (and time) helped
compensate for the absence of any formal investigatory tools.
On the other hand, more resources did not compensate for the
absence of the formal power to compel information. Key
witnesses undermined the appellate investigation through
106 When the prosecutor heard about Hernandez’s statement, he deemed
Hernandez a liar, and stated his value as a confidential informant (CI) was now worthless.
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their refusal or reluctance to cooperate. The Jimenez postconviction investigation suggests: (1) that the power to compel
pretrial attendance and testimony, along with documents that
should be subject to scrutiny, would be significantly more
efficient than conducting an informal investigation, (2) that the
appellate team would have found critical information with the
aid of formal investigatory powers, and (3) that the idea that
the defense has nothing to offer as a party to the investigation
overestimates the likelihood that the State got the case right.
III.

RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST FORMAL DISCOVERY

The resistance to granting a criminal defendant the
power to investigate has deep roots. In 1960, Professor Robert
Fletcher wrote:
Historically, discovery was unavailable in either civil or criminal
cases, and, despite the full development of discovery in civil cases,
denial in criminal cases has persisted. Even as recently as 1927, Mr.
Justice Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals,
could see only the faint beginnings of a doctrine which would allow
discovery in a criminal case. To achieve the degree of liberality that
recent cases show, the courts have had to overcome the inertial force
of a long and deeply imbedded practice designed to keep the
defendant in the dark as long as possible.107

If the hand that rocks the cradle forms our world-view,
then the law school experience establishes lasting impressions
of what information is sufficient to resolve litigation in a civil
or criminal law forum. Civil procedure casebooks provide a
comprehensive treatment of formal discovery rights available
to litigants. One casebook dedicates 60 pages to the subject.108
But in criminal procedure casebooks there is little discussion of
discovery challenges faced by a defendant. One textbook states
a criminal defendant’s “discovery provisions uniformly are
broader than prosecution discovery provisions”109 as if to
suggest he is somehow entitled to more information than the
prosecutor, who sits at the helm of a massive law enforcement
apparatus. With few exceptions,110 casebooks are silent on the
discovery disparity between criminal and civil litigants. If
Fletcher, supra note 57, at 294.
ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 608-68 (3d ed. 2009).
109 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 41, at 1201.
110 JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 880 (4th ed. 2010).
107
108
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casebooks are intended to inform a student about the legal
world as it is, not pointing out the discovery disparity is a
failure to do exactly that. Yet, criminal casebooks miss this
opportunity to educate law students about the nature of this
disparity and whether it has a legitimate justification.
This insularity between disciplines continues into
practice. There is little cross-pollination between criminal and
civil practitioners.111 On the rare occasion civil practitioners
step into the criminal arena they “tend to be stunned and often
outraged by their inability to depose government witnesses or
even to file interrogatories or requests for admissions.”112 A
colleague teaching criminal procedure recently broke with this
tradition of segregation. Knowing students had taken a
semester of civil procedure, he introduced a hypothetical
complaint and asked students how they would investigate if
they represented the criminal defendant. Hands went up and
depositions were scheduled, interrogatories drafted, requests for
documents propounded. My colleague let fall the hammer:
Padawans, you have none of these formal discovery tools
available to you and your anticipated investigation has just been
rendered impossible.113 Confronted by the inequity from an
advocate’s point of view, a sense of injustice emerged.114
To remedy the informational asymmetry in criminal
law, scholarship tends to focus on giving a defendant more
access to the prosecutorial file.115 But this solution merely
expands the disclosure of State-authored reports. In a study
funded by the Pew Foundation, the Justice Institute proposed:
Mandatory and open-file discovery, in which prosecutors make their
entire case file available to the defense and disclose particular items
at required times, leads to a more efficient criminal justice system
that better protects against wrongful imprisonment and renders
more reliable convictions.116

111 David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa,
94 GEORGETOWN L.J. 683, 684 (2006).
112 Id. at 714-15.
113 A padawan is a young Jedi in training. Padawan, WOOKIEEPEDIA: THE
STAR WARS WIKI, http://starwars.wikia.com/Padawan (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
114 Interview with Byron Lichstein, Associate Clinical Professor, University of
Wisconsin Law School, in Madison, Wis. (Nov. 15, 2012) (notes on file with author).
115 Joy, supra note 6, at 641 (“The surest way to meet and exceed Brady
disclosure obligations is to adopt an ‘open file’ discovery policy-essentially making
available to the defense all of the information in the prosecutor’s possession.”).
116 THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: A
POLICY REVIEW 2 (2007), www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
Death_penalty_reform/Expanded%20discovery%20policy%20brief.pdf.
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This proposal does not correct for the State’s immense
power to collect facts that favor its own position. Expanding a
defendant’s access to the State’s file remains a solution anchored
in the pre-modern discovery era—that the defendant should be a
passive recipient of information as opposed to having an
essential, formal role in the investigation of the case.
The term “open-file policy” is misleading. The policy
provides only a vague degree of access to the prosecutorial file
and no access to the police department’s investigatory file.117
Providing a criminal defendant with a single investigatory
tool—the right to compel documents—would exceed the value
of any open-file policy. Use of the tool would override the
common law rule that investigatory files are protected from
disclosure and provide access to prosecutorial and police files.
Given that a defendant might seek documents about witnesses
and incidents law enforcement did not consider, use of the tool
would potentially educate the prosecutor about reports her own
detectives failed to consider.
An open-file policy does not authorize a defendant to
question any information the State discloses.118 Given that 90%
of criminal defendants plead guilty, an open-file policy does not
prevent the State from representing the strength of its case
based on a narrative that is free from adequate scrutiny.119 Yet,
despite the slight narrowing of the information gap that would
be accomplished by an open-file policy, resistance to its
implementation continues. To go beyond an open-file policy and
to grant a criminal defendant formal investigatory power meets
fiercer resistance. Would the power give defendant an unfair
advantage? What would he do with such power? Would he
subvert the truth and harass or threaten witnesses? Would he
waste resources that are better used to control crime?
A.

A Concern that a Defendant Will Have an Unfair
Advantage

In criminal law disputes, neither party has use of those
particular formal investigatory tools that civil litigants wield—
See supra Figure 1.
A defense attorney who wishes to call a witness to testify may be dissuaded
by his inability to conduct a prior interview. To unintentionally elicit information
harmful to the defendant can expose the attorney to allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Montoya, supra note 57, at 862.
119 See supra note 36 (regarding percentage of criminal defendants who plea
versus advance to trial).
117

118
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depositions, requests for documents, and interrogatories. If
neither party has access to these formal tools, how can one
party claim unfair treatment? And if both parties have equal
status, then wouldn’t giving one party more power constitute
an unfair advantage? As a preliminary matter, denying
investigative opportunities to both parties does not improve the
quality of facts that inform a dispute. As to fairness, it is not
necessarily secured by ensuring that all parties are similarly
deprived or empowered. Parties to a criminal dispute are not in
any case similarly situated—“[t]oday’s defense counsel must meet
the prosecutor’s particularly formidable and unprecedented
arsenal of fact-gathering methods, including the use of an
organized police force to marshal the evidence prior to trial.”120
Nor are parties to a criminal dispute similarly deprived—the
State in fact exercises its own brand of formal investigatory
powers. To treat parties the same during the pretrial period is
to leave the criminal defendant at a distinct disadvantage.
Unlike a criminal defendant, the State conducts a
formal investigation through the exercise of police powers.
Cloaked in state authority, agents have the formal power to
arrest,121 search a person or place,122 seize evidence, interrogate
potential suspects, and, in some instances, threaten dire
consequences to ensure cooperation of potential witnesses—
such as a probation hold and revocation to prison123 or the loss
of custody of one’s child.124 In some jurisdictions, prosecutors
convene a grand jury, a proceeding that in many respects
120 Montoya, supra note 57, at 870, 862 (“Professor Stanley Fisher has
documented a pro-prosecution bias in police investigation and reporting.”).
121 See
WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND
CONFESSIONS § 23:9 (2013) for a discussion of the police and other state officials who
are given statutory authority to perform arrests.
122 This power is limited by the Fourth Amendment, which protects against
unreasonable searches by government agents. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
123 Officers often work with probation agents to place holds on probationers to
facilitate investigation of a crime. See Howard P. Schneiderman, Conflicting
Perspectives from the Bench and the Field on Probationer Home Searches—Griffin v.
Wisconsin Reconsidered, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 607, 615; see also Wagner v. State, 277
N.W.2d 849, 853-54 (Wis. 1979) (holding that a probation hold of approximately
twenty-eight hours to investigate Wagner’s potential involvement in a serious crime
was not inappropriately long).
124 A common threat women experience in poor neighborhoods is that the
failure to cooperate will result in the loss of their children. This sort of pressure can
also be used against a defendant. Regina Kelly was caught up in “a big drug sweep
based on the word of a confidential informant who later would be proven unreliable.”
Because Kelly was being held in jail, and there was no one to care for her kids, she pled
guilty, receiving 10 years of probation. Those who advanced to trial sat for months—
those cases were thrown out for lack of any reliable evidence. The Plea: Erma Fay
Stewart and Regina Kelly, PBS FRONTLINE (June 17, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/stewart.html.
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resembles a civil litigant’s pretrial deposition power.125 None of
these formal investigatory mechanisms are available to a
criminal defendant.
The State’s formal discovery tools are in some instances
more robust than tools afforded to civil litigants. A civil litigant
may have the power to inspect documents of her opponent at a
mutually reasonable location, but she does not have the State’s
power to conduct a physical search of a person’s premises and
seize property. And though the State does not have the power to
depose witnesses, prosecutors have the power to convene a grand
jury, which extends pretrial subpoena power to a prosecutor in
order to compel testimony and conduct a secret investigation.
The State also has the authority to conduct a pretrial
interrogation, which is similar to and potentially more powerful
than a deposition. Unlike an attorney taking a deposition, an
officer is permitted to repeat a question forcefully and express an
opinion that the defendant is guilty, a powerful tactic. (Use of this
tactic, however favorable to the State’s position, may lack
integrity—approximately 25% of DNA exonerations arose out of
cases in which the defendant falsely confessed to the crime.126)
Depositions tend to take place in a pleasant enough room while
interrogations take place in cinderblock cells. Attendance at a
deposition is compelled by the threat of judicial sanction for
failure to comply with a subpoena. Participating in an
interrogation is compelled by the request of a law enforcement
officer or through arrest. The refusal to answer to authority is
rare even after arrest, which unlike a subpoena requires no
notice to any opposing counsel.127
In a deposition, the witness typically has counsel. In an
interrogation, the witness is typically alone and answering to
one or more officers. In an interrogation, there are no
significant time restraints. An interrogation may be conducted
in multiple rounds by different interrogators at any time—often in
125 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. There is no requirement, however, that states employ
the use of a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884). Most states have
procedures to convene grand juries, and about a third require grand jury indictments for
felonies. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, NCJ 212351, STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION 2004 215-17 (Aug. 2006), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/
collection/juries/id/180.
126 DNA
Exonerations
Nationwide,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php.
127 Only 22% of those placed in custody invoke their Miranda rights and
refuse to speak to police during an interrogation. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 653 (1996).
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the middle of the night—and may potentially transpire throughout
a long duration of custody.128 The subject is isolated from his
support system. Officers may threaten the witness/suspect,129
falsely suggest others are implicating him,130 or manufacture a nonexistent case against him to obtain information.131 In contrast, civil
attorneys taking a deposition are ethically barred from engaging in
deception and deterred from doing so. Opposing counsel is not only
present, but interactions are transcribed. Any ethical violation
would be on the record and could lead to a disciplinary review
that the opposing party may be happy to set into motion.132
A key advantage to the interrogation is the resulting report.
State agents interpret a witness’s responses and summarize the
interview.133 After a deposition, a civil litigator may believe he
neutralized a witness. A later review of the transcript, however,
might suggest his line of questioning proved something less or
128 In State v. Masch, Milwaukee Case No. 2003CF004581, defendant was
held in custody over a period of 58 hours and subject to four separate interrogations
conducted by four different pairs of officers that totaled approximately 14 hours. The
final pair of interrogators, two experienced homicide detectives, were called in by
special request to break the defendant.
129 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTORS GO WRONG 39 (2011) (noting a case in which 17-year-old Paula
Gray, who was borderline mentally impaired, inculpated herself and four other
innocent people in a double murder. “Gray testified that she was asked, ‘Did they
emphasize what would happen if you did not tell this story?’ and answered, ‘That they
would kill me.’”).
130 See, e.g., David K. Shipler, Op-Ed., Why Do Innocent People Confess?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/opinion/sunday/
why-do-innocent-people-confess.html?pagewanted=all (noting a case in which 17-year
old Martin Tankleff discovered his mother murdered and his father barely alive; he
was told, falsely, by the detective interrogating him that his father awoke from his
coma and said “Marty, you did it”).
131 See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 129, at 22-23. David Vasquez, for example,
was told by police that his fingerprints were found at the scene of a murder and
eventually confessed. Id. at 22. He was exonerated after the real perpetrator was
found; he had served four years in prison by that time. Know the Cases: David Vasquez,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org/Content/David_Vasquez.php.
132 Since the purpose of an interrogation, generally, is to cause the subject to
confess, police often use “persuasive techniques comprising trickery, deceit and
psychological manipulation.” Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and
Confessions, in INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: RIGHTS, RESEARCH, REGULATION 123,
124 (Tom Williamson ed., 2006). In contrast, several of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct would be implicated if an attorney engaged in deception during a deposition.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2011) (governing truthfulness in
statements to others); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2011) (prohibiting
deceitful behavior); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 cmt. 5 (2011) (“The duty
to refrain from disruptive conduct applies to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a
deposition.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 1 (2011) (indicating that
the rule governing candor to the tribunal includes conduct during a deposition).
133 Police fabrication of reports is a significant problem, since police reports are
often “dispositive in a case resolved through plea bargaining.” Christopher Slobogin,
Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1044 (1996).
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nothing at all. This “morning after” disappointment does not occur
for detectives who obtain an inculpatory statement or author the
resulting summary of their efforts. The State and its agents almost
always retain rights over the narrative.134 The interrogation in
these ways serves as a “shadow deposition” that potentially
provides the State an investigatory tool with greater advantages
than a formal deposition.
The view that the parties to a criminal dispute are
equally situated is as erroneous as it is pervasive. Ignoring the
deep asymmetry between an empowered State and a frequently
detained defendant, the misapplied concept—to equate equal
treatment with fairness—is embedded in the rules of criminal
procedure. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for
example, adopt the concept of “reciprocity.”135 Only after a
criminal defendant requests certain information from the State
may the prosecutor then request the same category of
information from defendant—a statutory expression of “I’ll
show you mine if you show me yours.” If, for example, a
criminal defendant requests documents that the prosecutor
plans to use at trial, only then may the prosecutor request the
same disclosure from the defendant.136 This concept of
reciprocal exchange suggests equal burden and measure,
masking the deep disparity that exists between the parties.
The state apparatus brings to bear impressive formal
investigatory powers. A criminal defendant must sip from the
cup of his opponent. Affording formal investigatory tools to a
defendant would begin to correct for this existing imbalance yet
leave intact the State’s inherent investigatory and trial
advantages. The State would still conduct a formal, unregulated
pre-complaint investigation. The State’s officers would still
summarize their own interviews. The State would still control a
police force that has the qualified right to search and seize, to
engage in deception and threats to secure information, and to
employ suggestive lineup procedures that target a suspect. The
State would still have at its disposal detectives to authoritatively
134 As of 2010, 17 states and the District of Columbia required recording of
suspect confessions under certain circumstances. See Alan M. Gershel, A Review of the
Law in Jurisdictions Requiring Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 16
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2010).
135 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 amendment (“The
House version of the bill provides that the government’s discovery is reciprocal. If the
defendant requires and receives certain items from the government, then the
government is entitled to get similar items from the defendant. . . . The Conference
adopts the House provisions.”).
136 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(ii).
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explain the course of the investigation to a jury, providing a
theatrical display of self-validation. And the State would still pull
from its stable of law enforcement experts to testify about the
results a scientifically untested but quite persuasive analysis.137
B.

A Concern That a Defendant Will Threaten Witnesses

In 1974, an effort to require pretrial disclosure of the
State’s witnesses in federal criminal disputes met vigorous
opposition. The United States Department of Justice reported
that allowing this disclosure would be “dangerous and
frightening in that government witnesses and their families will
even be more exposed than they are now to threats, pressures,
and physical harm.”138 There is little empirical guidance on the
issue. Since 1974, some state jurisdictions have permitted a
criminal defendant access to witness lists—one would expect
that any significant uptick in witness intimidation would have
led to a repeal of this policy. Yet these provisions remain on the
books.139 Justice William Brennan, observing that particular
circumstances might warrant concern, opined “the proper
response . . . cannot be to prevent discovery altogether; it is
rather to regulate discovery in those cases in which it is thought
that witness intimidation is a real possibility.”140 Beyond the
issuance of protective orders in cases where there is reason to
believe that a particular witness is in danger, there are
sufficient existing deterrents to prevent witness intimidation.
Pretrial custody reduces a defendant’s ability to communicate
with the outside world. Communications from the jail are
monitored. A jailhouse call revealing an attempt to intimidate
a witness may be used against a defendant as affirmative
evidence of guilt.141 Under federal law, anyone who attempts to
dissuade a witness from testifying faces 20 years in prison.142
137 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNSEL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES—A PATH FORWARD 22 (2009) (“Some forensic science disciplines are
supported by little rigorous systematic research to validate the discipline’s basic
premises and techniques.”); id. at 42 (“The fact is that many forensic tests—such as
those used to infer the source of toolmarks or bite marks—have never been exposed to
stringent scientific scrutiny.”).
138 Brennan, Jr., supra note 12, at 6 (quoting Justice Department testimony
before Congress) (footnotes omitted).
139 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(a) (West 2013); ILL. SUP. CT. R.
412(a)(i); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16(I).
140 Brennan, Jr., supra note 12, at 14.
141 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 276 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Evidence
that the defendant threatened a potential witness or a person cooperating with a
government investigation is relevant to show the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.”).
142 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2012).
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In permitting a defendant deposition power, there is
concern over subjecting a victim or witness to a defendant’s
presence at a deposition “without the security provided by the
courtroom setting.”143 A criminal defendant’s presence at a
deposition, however, is not constitutionally required.144 In those
jurisdictions that permit depositions in criminal cases, “only
defense counsel need be present . . . .”145 For example, Missouri
provides a default rule that a criminal defendant “shall not be
physically present at a discovery deposition except by agreement
of the parties or upon court order for good cause shown.”146 Florida
provides protections for “sensitive witnesses.”147 A related
argument is that a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault
might be deterred from cooperating. She would face the anxiety of
being subjected to hours of deposition testimony that, by design,
allows for questioning that exceeds what could be explored at
trial. Precautions would mitigate these concerns: ensuring that
the defendant is not present, limiting the time to depose the
victim, making certain subjects, like past sexual history, off
limits, and restricting the distribution of testimony to attorneys.
Left unexplored by those concerned about witness
intimidation is the fact that a criminal defendant is powerless
to counter state-initiated efforts to intimidate witnesses. Stateinitiated threats can be serious in nature and effective.148 In
2010, after 15 years of prison, Jabbar Collins was exonerated of
KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 41, at 1206.
The right to confront witnesses against the defendant only ripens at trial.
See Sarah A. Stauffer & Sean D. Corey, Sixth Amendment at Trial, 87 GEO. L.J. 1641,
1647-48 (1999). In Florida, a defendant is not allowed to be present at a deposition
absent court approval or stipulation by the parties. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(7). The
Florida Supreme Court concluded a discovery deposition does not provide for
meaningful cross-examination of the deponent because a discovery deposition is not a
device designed to gather testimony for later use at trial. State v. Lopez, 974 So. 2d
340, 347 (Fla. 2008).
145 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 41, at 1206.
146 MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.12(c).
147 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(4) (providing, “[d]epositions of children under the age
of 16 shall be videotaped unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court may order the
videotaping of a deposition or the taking of a deposition of a witness with fragile emotional
strength to be in the presence of the trial judge or a special magistrate”).
148 See, e.g., A. G. Sulzberger, Facing Misconduct Claims, Brooklyn Prosecutor
Agrees to Free Man Held 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at A18 (discussing
exoneration of Jabbar Collins); see also Colin Moynihan, Cleared in One ’95 Killing, 3
Seek Reversal in Another, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/
03/nyregion/three-still-jailed-for-95-killing-seek-a-second-reversal.html
(same
witness
stated that she “feared retaliation from law enforcement” should she not testify); Colin
Moynihan, Cleared of One ’95 Murder, 3 Men Have Conviction Vacated in a 2nd, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/nyregion/convictions-of-three-in1995-murder-of-denise-raymond-overturned.html (witness recanted her testimony, saying it
was delivered under duress from law enforcement).
143

144
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murder after a key State witness testified in a post-conviction
proceeding that the prosecutor had threatened to hit him and
incarcerate him for any failure to testify in accordance with the
State’s theory.149 The witness was jailed for a week before he
eventually agreed to testify falsely for the State.150 The State may
also engage in threats to suppress potentially exculpatory
evidence—“[p]olice and prosecutorial improprieties take on
several different forms: [including] making threats against
potential witnesses for the accused.”151 In a Milwaukee homicide
case, a potential alibi witness told police that, at the time of the
shooting across town, he thought the defendant had arrived at the
witness’s residence. Officers threatened to tell the witness’s track
coach that the witness was lying in a homicide investigation and
warned that he would lose his scholarship.152 Without the power
to compel pretrial answers from officers, witnesses, and those who
may have observed the exchange, a defendant cannot overcome
the threat’s effectiveness.
State witnesses are not the only individuals subject to
intimidation. A witness with exculpatory or inculpatory
information may refuse to come forward because he fears
retribution from an alternate suspect or the State. The
potentiality of witness retaliation is real, but the source of that
retaliation may be State agents, a State witness, or an alternate
suspect. Both parties should have sufficient powers to expose
incidents of intimidation. The State has that power through the
use of its police force and witness protection programs; a
defendant does not.
C.

A Concern That a Defendant Will Misuse Formal Powers

A perennial concern over providing formal investigatory
power to a criminal defendant is that he will misuse it to delay
the State’s case.153 The predicate conditions to committing

Sulzberger, supra note 148, at A18.
Id.
151 See C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL
CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 71 (1996).
152 This example is based on an investigation conducted by the Wisconsin
Innocence Project. Interviewed five years after the event, the young man, now working
at a bank and running a non-profit to assist inner-city kids, confirmed detectives made
these threats. Information on file with author.
153 Brennan, Jr., supra note 12, at 6 (detailing arguments made by Chief
Justice Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court against liberal discovery for
criminal defendants); Brown, supra note 2, at 1590 (“defense counsel’s commitment is
not to accuracy; it is to his or her clients, many of whom want inaccuracy to mask their
149
150
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discovery abuse, however, are typically absent from criminal
law. Discovery abuse in civil litigation is associated with
document-heavy cases in which well-resourced opponents
engage in dilatory practices by propounding unnecessary
discovery requests or dumping truckloads of marginally
responsive documents on opposing counsel.154 Other than in
white-collar disputes (which represent a very small fraction of
criminal cases), these tactics would not typically be available to
a criminal defendant—the vast majority of criminal defendants
are indigent. Any attempt by a defense attorney to
unnecessarily subpoena law enforcement officers would reach
the ears of the prosecutor and court. That an overworked public
defender would have the time, interest, or resources to engage
in discovery abuse is unlikely.
The concern that a criminal defendant would only use
discovery rights to subvert the process is likely grounded in the
presumption that the State generally “gets it right”—that the
criminal defendant is guilty. But this resistance to affording a
presumptively liable party with investigatory power appears to
be reserved for a criminal defendant. There is no movement to
deprive a civil defendant of formal powers where the defendant
is most certainly liable—Exxon in the Puget Sound oil spill
litigation, for example.155 Rather, we leave it to a civil
defendant, however liable, to use its sometimes impressive
resources (resources a criminal defendant might never possess)
to protect its interests. In this sense, the potentiality that a
liable party would be motivated to interfere with an
investigation is not unique to criminal law. A civil defendant
may face overwhelming liability that leads to damage control

guilt”). It should be noted that Brown nevertheless proposes more robust discovery,
advocating for an open-file policy. Id. at 1637-38.
154 See, e.g., Kawamata Farms v. United Agri Prods., 948 P.2d 1055, 1090-91
(Haw. 1997) (“The record shows that DuPont engaged in a pattern of discovery abuse
by, among other things, violating the circuit court’s discovery orders, ‘dumping’ forty
boxes of documents pursuant to one of the Plaintiffs’ interrogatory requests, and
intentionally withholding information and documents that DuPont should have
produced during discovery. This inexcusable behavior by DuPont is very disturbing.”);
Class Action starring Gene Hackman and Mary Mastrantonio. CLASS ACTION (20th
Century Fox 1991).
155 Exxon’s big boat spilled ll million gallons of oil into a pristine bay. Exxon
argued it was free from liability, but was found to be “worse than negligent but less
than malicious.” The Supreme Court, however, did agree with Exxon that maritime
common law principles applied, reducing a $2.5 billion punitive award. Under
maritime law punitive damages should not exceed a 1:1 ratio with compensatory
damages ($507 million). See David Savage, Justices Slash Exxon Valdez Verdict, L.A.
TIMES, June 26, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/26/nation/na-valdez26.
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behaviors, from destroying documents156 to making examples of
employees who breach conceptions of loyalty.157 But these
potentialities do not result in calls to preclude a civil defendant
from testing plaintiff’s theories.
At the same time, should formal investigatory powers be
extended to criminal defendants, some defense attorneys would
inevitably engage in delay or subterfuge. Civil procedure
provides for checks on dilatory practice, including the
imposition of protective orders and judicial sanctions.158 In
Florida, where formal investigatory rights are extended to the
criminal defendant, due process does not preclude a court from
sanctioning him for violating discovery rules, including the
power to prohibit him from calling a witness or introducing
documentary evidence.159
On the other hand, the concern that a criminal
defendant will use discovery tools to subvert the truth ignores
the possibility that law enforcement will use police powers to
subvert the truth. The lack of formal investigatory power
renders a criminal defendant particularly vulnerable to a law
enforcement officer who falsifies witness testimony in police
reports. A former San Francisco Police Commissioner recently
156 Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoilate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need
for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 793 (1991) (“[O]ne half of litigators
believe that ‘unfair and inadequate disclosure of material information prior to trial [is] a
“regular or frequent” problem . . . [and] 69% of surveyed antitrust attorneys [have]
encountered unethical practices,’ in including, most commonly, destruction of evidence.”).
157 Whistleblower statutes—those statutes that protect people who expose
wrongdoing by either incentivizing their decision to speak or protecting them from
retaliation—reflect policymakers’ attention to this problem in the civil sphere. See
generally Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99 (2000) (discussing legislative and
judicial protections available to whistleblowers in the United States); see also Paul
Sullivan, The Price Whistle-Blowers Pay for Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/your-money/for-whistle-blowers-consider-the-riskswealth-matters.html?pagewanted=all (“If you look at the field of whistle-blowers, you
see a high degree of bankruptcies. You may find yourself unemployable. Home
foreclosures, divorce, suicide and depression all go with this territory.”) A spokesman
for Taxpayers Against Fraud stated that, for whistleblowers, “[t]here is a 100 percent
chance that you will be unemployed—the question is, Will you be forever
unemployable? . . . The other 100 percent factor is the person who fired you, the person
who designed and implemented the fraud, won’t be fired. He’ll probably be promoted
again.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Statutes like Title VII’s retaliation
provisions are meant to prevent such results. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
158 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment
(“Excessive discovery and evasion or resistance to reasonable discovery requests pose
significant problems.”). In response, the Advisory Committee struck the language
stating “the frequency of use of the various discovery methods was not to be limited”
with the intent that parties, when appropriate, would file a protective order. Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
159 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(n).
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complained of the incidence of narcotics officers falsifying
evidence.160 In another instance, Bronx Assistant District
Attorney Jeannette Rucker determined that “it had become
apparent that the police were arresting people even when there
was convincing evidence that they were innocent,” and found
that officers had provided “false written statements” to justify
the arrests.161 Despite such concerns, a criminal defendant has
no formal power to depose officers or the witnesses subject to
State incentives, threats, or police falsification.
Not all civil litigants are angels and not all civil
disputes are just about money. Like in the criminal law, civil
cases can be of great significance.162 At issue might be a critical
question about whether a health condition is covered by
insurance, whether a bay fouled by oil will be restored, or
whether minority students should be subjected to a segregated
school system. We provide all potentially serious civil
wrongdoers—whose decisions have led to discrimination,
bankruptcies, injury, death, and environmental degradation—
robust pretrial power to potentially undermine the truth. There
is little reason that a criminal defendant, presumed innocent,
should not be privileged to sit among such company. We might
reframe the issue: irrespective of whether a criminal defendant
is innocent, guilty, or ultimately something in between, he is
motivated to challenge the State’s theory of liability. The fact
that a criminal defendant faces significant consequences best
positions him to check mistakes made by his opponent.
In the end, it is not the significance of the issues that
distinguishes a criminal defendant from his fellow tortfeasors.
Rather, the distinguishing characteristic is the unique burden
160 Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed, Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
3, 2013, at SR4.
161 Id.
162 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1976); Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Mass Tort Litigation: The New
Private Law Dispute Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 415 (1999) (stating that the
“aggregative private dispute resolution paradigm resembles nothing so much as private
legislation with wide-reaching effects, carrying the imprimatur of judicial oversight
and approval, but frequently accompanied by troubling questions about fairness,
adequate representation, and the subtle merger of legislative, administrative, and
judicial functions”); see also Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 730 (1906) (read by Roscoe before the
American Bar Association in St. Paul, Minnesota on August 29, 1906) (“The rules
which define those invisible boundaries within which each may act without conflict
with the activities of his fellows in a busy and crowded world, upon which investor,
promoter, buyer, seller, employer and employee must rely consciously or subconsciously
in their every-day transactions, are conditions precedent of modern social and
industrial organization.”).
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borne by the criminal defendant. He faces severe punishment—
the loss of liberty and damage to reputation, inhumane
conditions of prison, and the assured lack of opportunities
following release. All of these concerns underscore the
importance of providing the criminal defendant with formal
investigatory tools to defend himself. Added to this is the desire
that a criminal defendant be able to defend himself in
accordance with the “categorical ex ante judgment that society
would prefer to let a guilty person go free rather than send an
innocent person to prison.”163
And a criminal defendant may in fact be innocent. To
deprive a criminal defendant of formal investigatory power
underestimates how difficult it may be for a factually innocent
defendant to secure an acquittal. An innocent defendant likely
has no idea who committed the crime. Alibis tend to be hard to
prove. An alibi may be unsophisticated and, when tested by a
talented prosecutor, appear suspect. A crime may occur at
night (it often does) and an alibi that asserts the defendant went
to sleep could not confirm he did not slip out. The theory that the
State’s high burden of proof will set an innocent defendant free164
is a weak insurance policy against an erroneous eyewitness
account, for example, which is highly resilient to crossexamination.165 In some cases, only affirmative evidence
demonstrating that an alternate suspect likely committed the
crime is sufficient to overcome the State’s case. To demonstrate
innocence in such circumstances, the defense attorney cannot rely
on the State’s evidence but must instead conduct an independent
inquiry that leads to a different result.
D.

A Concern that Trial is the Proper Forum for Testing the
Case

Providing criminal defendants with formal investigatory
tools might make the pretrial period more adversarial, and
there is a concern that doing so would waste resources during a
period in which most criminal defendants voluntarily admit

163 Redish, supra note 23, at 855 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
358; Alexander Volokh, Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174–77 (1997)).
164 Leipold, supra note 12, at 1152 (“Because it has the burden of proof, the
prosecutor collects most of the evidence.”).
165 Brown, supra note 2, at 1602 (“Once an eyewitness’s memory has been
affected by suggestive identification procedures, it is hard to undo the damage.”).
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guilt.166 There is a significant body of scholarship, however,
that challenges the assumption that all pleas are voluntary.167
And for those criminal defendants who are overcharged or
innocent, the lack of formal discovery tools leaves a criminal
defendant ill-prepared by the time he advances to trial.
Trial provides an inappropriate forum to conduct an
investigation of the case. By the time a jury is impaneled,
litigants should not be exploring alternative theories of
liability. Pretrial motions have been decided. Litigants have
determined what narrative they want to convey. Any absence
of a trial strategy at this juncture would constitute deficient
performance—a trial strategy to “figure out what to do after we
investigate at trial” is per se deficient.168 Even if a defendant
attempted to conduct an investigation at trial, the rules of
evidence would inhibit the effort; hearsay, inadmissible at trial, is
essential to establishing investigative leads.169 Cross-examination
is designed to cement, not uncover, a narrative. Trial does not
provide the optimum forum to refresh a witness’ recollection, a
process that can result in long periods of silence as a witness
reviews documents. Trial is in part a public spectacle, roles have
already been assigned, the script finalized. If a defendant has not
adequately investigated the incident by the eve of trial, it is too
late for defendant. He will lose.
And trial is not where disputes are predominantly
resolved.170 As to the few disputes that advance to trial, the
quality of facts informing strategy and witness selection is
inextricably tied to the quality of the pretrial investigation. A
pretrial investigation also protects the record. It is not uncommon
for a witness to miss a trial appearance due to unstable living
arrangements, mental health and substance abuse issues, or
166 Gershman, supra note 8, at 145 (“[W]hereas a fair trial involves a forced
settlement of a factual dispute in a fair adversarial contest before a judge and jury, a
fair plea typically does not involve a factual dispute.”).
167 Langer, supra note 5, at 276 (suggesting more discovery rights like openfile policies to counteract the conditions that lead to coerced pleas).
168 See, e.g., Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 846 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n
attorney’s performance is not immunized from Sixth Amendment challenges simply by
attaching to it the label of ‘trial strategy.’ Rather, ‘[c]ertain defense strategies may be
so ill-chosen that they may render counsel’s overall representation constitutionally
defective.’”) (citing United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 586 (9th Cir. 1983)).
169 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802-04. The hearsay rule alone precludes
conducting an adequate investigation—the question, “who told you that?” being central
to any investigation. In addition, the “other acts rule” precludes inquiring about what
the witness has done, and his knowledge of what others have done, in the past. See
FED. R. EVID. 404.
170 Whereas 90 percent of criminal disputes resolve in a plea deal, only 10
percent of criminal litigants advance to trial. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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trouble with the law. A formal investigatory tool like the
deposition provides an insurance policy against no-shows. Unlike
the one-shot opportunity presented at trial, a party has time to
make pretrial attempts to secure a witness’ attendance at a
deposition. If a witness fails to appear for trial, any recorded or
written prior statement will typically constitute inadmissible
hearsay. A deposition, however, ensures that in these
circumstances admissible portions of the witness’s transcript will
be admitted at trial under the “former testimony” exception to the
hearsay rule.171 A jury should consider what all critical witnesses
have to say. Substantive deliberation should not be undermined
by the unavailability of a witness on the day of trial.
E.

A Concern That Defendant Already Has Enough Rights

A criminal defendant has constitutional protections
designed to check abuses by a police force that is otherwise
authorized to search, seize, arrest, interrogate, lie, and
threaten serious consequences for non-cooperation. These
constitutional rights are defensive in nature. They grant no
affirmative power to a defendant to develop evidence (with the
notable exception of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
They also do little to check the intentions of the state
apparatus. Deference typically afforded to an officer’s account
of conditions on the ground and the exceptions to the warrant
requirement render the suppression of evidence rare.172
Individuals tend to cooperate in custodial interrogations
despite a right to remain silent.173 Regarding constitutional
efforts to prevent police coercion, in jurisdictions that do not
require officers to record the interrogation the judge weighs the
credibility of a criminal defendant who allegedly confessed to
criminal activity against the credibility of officers.
Because these constitutional protections are defensive
in nature, they do not provide a criminal defendant any
affirmative right to engage in fact-finding. Yet some might find
it particularly unfair to give the criminal defendant a right to
compel information from the State’s witnesses when the
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to
Suppress and “Lost Cases:” The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions,
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1044-45 (1991) (citing to a 1979 study of almost
3,000 cases conducted by the General Accounting Office that found successful motions
to suppress were made in 1.3% of the prosecuted cases).
173 Leo, supra note 127, at 653 (finding that only 22% of those placed in custody
invoke their Miranda rights and refuse to speak to police during an interrogation).
171

172

1136

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:3

defendant can elect to invoke the Fifth Amendment.174 This
argument does not acknowledge that the existing informational
asymmetry between the parties would persist even if formal
discovery powers were only extended to a criminal defendant. A
criminal defendant will never match the State’s exercise of
police powers through a sophisticated police force.
The concern also overstates the Fifth Amendment’s
limitation on the State’s power. It is common for civil litigants to
be foreclosed from making inquiries into privileged information,
however probative that evidence might be. In a shareholder suit,
a plaintiff can expect to be prevented from inquiring into an
executive board meeting held in the presence of the board’s
attorney. Yet, these privileges do not ultimately inhibit broad and
intrusive inquiry into the opposing party’s theory of the case.
Likewise, that the State may be foreclosed from deposing a
defendant would not preclude the State from compelling
testimony from a defendant’s friends, family, alibi, former
employers, landlords, and anyone else with relevant
information.175 And the State may not be the only party hindered
by the Fifth Amendment. The constitutional protection would also
pose a challenge to a defendant pursuing an alternate perpetrator
defense, as an alternate suspect deposed by defense counsel is
also privileged to claim a right to silence.
F.

A Concern That Formal Discovery Would Be Too Costly

One concern over extending formal discovery is “that
depositions are very costly, and with the state footing the bill
for indigent defendants, there is no financial sacrifice that
would provide a restraint against appointed counsel conducting
unnecessary depositions.”176 Providing deposition power, however,
will not relieve public defenders of a relentless caseload.177 In
Wisconsin, for example, a public defender must meet an annual
quota of 200 points—receiving a half-point for a misdemeanor,
174 See United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), for Judge
Learned Hand’s position against expanding discovery to a criminal defendant.
175 Florida’s approach to discovery depositions in criminal proceedings provide an
example of how discovery depositions can be used in the criminal justice system without
running afoul of the confrontation clause. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1)(A)-(D) (allowing both
the defendant and the prosecution to depose certain categories of witnesses).
176 KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 41, at 1206.
177 Peter A. Joy, Ensuring the Ethical Representation of Clients in the Face of
Excessive Caseloads, 75 MO. L. REV. 771, 777 (2010) (“Most commentators and bar
leaders agree that the major factors contributing to poor quality of defense services are
excessive caseloads, lack of funds for expert witnesses and investigators, and extremely
low pay rates for court-assigned lawyers and contract defense services.”).
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and upwards of 20 points for a homicide.178 An entry-level public
defender must dispose of 400 cases in one year to meet her
minimum. Those litigating on the felony calendar and
predominantly taking Class A felony cases “reduce” their
workload to two or three homicide cases a month. Wisconsin
public defenders actually fare better than public defenders of
other jurisdictions where “felony caseloads of 500, 600, and 800
or more are common.”179 Caseload realities effectively provide a
built-in deterrent to a deposition’s overuse.
In serious criminal cases, the stakes are high and the
sources of information tend to be limited. In the absence of
interrogatories to seed the investigation and subpoena power to
compel production of testimony and documents, conducting an
informal investigation may prove not only less effective, but
more costly than conducting a formal investigation. To the
extent that instances of discovery abuse surface, judicial
intervention provides a moderating role, and subsequent reform
efforts in the civil forum have sought to increase cooperative
behavior in exchanging information.180 Operationally, the
complexity of a dispute tends to govern the use of discovery. Even
where litigants have an arsenal of discovery tools at their
disposal, simple disputes—the majority of civil cases, in fact—are
resolved in the absence of discovery.181 In Florida, the legislature
considered this concern and has codified that “[n]o deposition
shall be taken in a case in which the defendant is charged only
with a misdemeanor . . . unless good cause can be shown to the
trial court.”182 A party in New Mexico may subpoena a witness,
record the interview, and direct an assistant to prepare a
transcript to which the opposing party typically stipulates, a
measure that greatly reduces costs associated with securing a

178 Interview with Michele LaVigne, Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis.
Law Sch., in Madison, Wis. (Jan. 23, 2012) (notes on file with author).
179 Five Problems Facing Public Defense on the 40th Anniversary of Gideon v.
Wainwright, NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, http://www.nlada.org/
Defender/Defender_Gideon/Defender_Gideon_5_Problems (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
180 FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment
(requiring mandatory disclosures, the “purpose of the revision is to accelerate the
exchange of basic information about the case and to eliminate the paper work involved
in requesting such information, and the rule should be applied in a manner to achieve
those objectives”).
181 David M. Trubeck et al., The Cost of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72,
89-90 (1983) (“Our data [analyzing civil litigation trends] suggest[s] that relatively little
discovery occurs in the ordinary lawsuit. We found no evidence of discovery in over half our
cases. Rarely did the records reveal more than five separate discovery events.”).
182 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1)(D).
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court reporter in a deposition.183 Formal discovery tools are
subject to customization. Properly configured, they are potentially
more effective and efficient than the informal discovery methods
currently available to the criminal defendant.
CONCLUSION
Rules that govern the exchange of information
ultimately reflect the quality of information society agrees to
afford litigants. A limited grant of discovery power would
suggest an unwillingness to disrupt daily life to resolve a
dispute. A small claims court, for example, does not permit
litigants to depose witnesses to determine the exact value of
damage done to a personal printer.184 In contrast, invasive
discovery tools are permitted in disputes deemed significant. In
civil disputes, litigants are afforded investigatory tools that
disrupt the lives of others. In this light, a criminal defendant
has more in common with a small claims litigant.
Precluding a criminal litigant from engaging in formal
investigation means that the quality of facts informing
resolutions is, relative to civil law outcomes, inferior. Entitled
to only discrete information, negotiations in criminal disputes
are based on allegations in the complaint, evidence favorable to
the State, and the raw power to threaten sobering penalties in
exchange for reduced punishment. One cannot imagine a civil
dispute in which a defendant’s settlement position is informed
by allegations in the complaint and documents selected by a
plaintiff. Yet, most criminal defendants are entitled to just
that,185 facilitating complaint-based outcomes that credit
prosecutorial hunches.
These
pretrial
deficiencies—affecting
90%
of
defendants186—are not cured by trial. The information that
informs a criminal trial, relative to civil trials, is also inferior.
The overwhelming source of information originates from the
State’s file—sources of potentially exculpatory evidence remain
unexplored and witnesses who have not been deposed are freer
to prevaricate. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Kyles v.
183 Interview with Katherine Judson, Innocence Project Litigation Fellow, in
Madison, Wis. (Oct. 23, 2012) (notes on file with author).
184 Small claims courts are characterized by the “lack of opportunity to conduct
discovery.” Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 347 (2003).
185 See supra Part I.C.
186 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Whitley187 that it is a legitimate defense to argue to the jury
that the State’s investigation was flawed. But a defendant
cannot discern the existence of this defense without the ability
to conduct an independent investigation to show what law
enforcement missed.
Civil discovery rules are designed to fuel a broad pretrial
investigation, one that uncovers and tests the credibility of
evidence before trial.188 The orientation of criminal discovery
rules toward the trial moment further diminishes a defendant’s
pretrial access to information.189 These disclosure provisions are
wedded to an event that rarely occurs. Some jurisdictions are
trial-centric in toto; Wisconsin does not require any disclosure of
State’s evidence until “a reasonable time before trial.”190
A criminal defendant is not entitled to play an essential
role in the investigation of his case. His right to be informed is
in every respect inferior to all other parties in the common law
system.191 In 1974, when changes were made to federal criminal
procedure to ensure that pretrial disclosure was mandatory
upon request, it was done because:
broad discovery contributes to the fair and efficient administration of
criminal justice by providing the defendant with enough information to
make an informed decision as to plea; by minimizing the undesirable
effect of surprise at the trial; and by otherwise contributing to an
accurate determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.192

This was the Advisory Board’s “Mission Accomplished”
moment—the finish line is a long way off.
The criminal defendant’s role in an investigation should be
reevaluated. Currently, he is a passive recipient of information.
Statutorily, he is afforded no role in the investigation of his own
case. Greater access to the prosecutorial file and more resources
would go some way to mitigate existing deprivations. But in light
of the State’s formal power to investigate, the failure to provide a
criminal defendant formal investigatory tools leaves potentially
187 514 U.S. 419, 445 (1995) (observing that disclosure of the informant’s
statements would have given the defense grounds to attack “the thoroughness and
even the good faith of the investigation”).
188 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
189 Langer, supra note 5, at 275 (stating that federal criminal procedure in
particular “establish[es] a mainly trial-centric approach to discovery rules”).
190 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(1) (West 2013) (requiring that certain disclosures
be made at a “reasonable time before trial”).
191 Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and
Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2044-45 (2006) (describing the “gulf
between criminal and civil discovery”).
192 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment.
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unsubstantiated narratives untested. Compared to the major
disputes resolved in civil litigation that are informed by multiple
sources and careful examination of witnesses and documents, the
criminal system remains shielded from the light of adversarial
testing. Over 50 years ago, the United States Supreme Court
stated, “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by
both parties is essential to proper litigation.”193 Criminal law has
been spared of this wisdom.

193

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (emphasis added).

